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This graph is similar to ‹gure 3 but is rendered here in color and includes
more sectors in each time period. Expand the graph to full-screen size in
color and you can easily see the patterns analyzed in the text. This graph
supports the argument in chapter 1 about organizational learning by Boliv-
ian municipalities: early investments in relatively less complicated educa-
tion and urban development projects helped build contracting and man-
agerial capacity, allowing municipalities to take on more complicated
investments (e.g., health, water, and sanitation) in later years.
Fig. 3. Public investment by sector and period, 1987–2007 (expanded color version).
Author’s calculations. (Data from Ministry of Finance, Vice Ministry of Popular
Participation, and Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.) This
graph is similar to ‹gure 3 but is rendered here in color and includes more sectors
in each time period. Expand the graph to full-screen size in color and you can eas-
ily see the patterns analyzed in the text. This graph supports the argument in chap-
ter 1 about organizational learning by Bolivian municipalities: early investments in
relatively less complicated education and urban development projects helped build
contracting and managerial capacity, allowing municipalities to take on more com-
plicated investments (e.g., health, water, and sanitation) in later years.
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bonus web chapter
The Micropolitical Foundations of Government
in Seven Bolivian Municipalities
Chapter 6 of Decentralization and Popular Democracy generalized from the
experiences of Viacha and Charagua to build a theoretical model in which
local government performance is driven by key factors in the local econ-
omy, politics, and society. I described ‹rst a structural framework that inte-
grates a number of well-established ideas about elections and lobbying with
more recent insights about civic organizations and social linkages. I then
placed the economic interests, political actors, and civic organizations at
the heart of this approach in a dynamic context to analyze how these actors
interact over time to produce public decision making that is responsive and
accountable to voters, or not.
The book mentions at various points that this theory is based on the ex-
periences of not only Viacha and Charagua, but seven other municipalities
as well. This chapter analyzes those municipalities and uses the theoretical
tools developed in the book to analyze the causes of the quality of govern-
ment in each.
The municipalities in question were studied at the same time and in the
same way as Viacha and Charagua, through a systematic program of exten-
sive semistructured and unstructured interviews of local government and
community leaders, key informants, and citizens at the grassroots level. De-
tailed ‹nancial, administrative, and geographic information was collected
in each district. As in Viacha and Charagua, the ‹eldwork was largely fo-
cused on recording the opinions of people at the neighborhood and village
levels on the quality of public services and local government they received,
and then determining how these outcomes came about. The municipalities
were chosen to include Bolivia’s main regions, ethnicities, and cultures, and
to mirror the country in terms of size, population, degree of urbanization,
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and economic base. The group thus “represents” Bolivia in the weak sense
of representing each of its essential characteristics in one or more of its
number, and not in the strong sense of a representative sample used in the
econometric work of chapters 4 and 7. The absence of opportunities for sta-
tistical inference is hopefully more than compensated, however, by the
depth of the analysis that this approach makes possible.
Of the seven municipalities, two are on the altiplano: Desaguadero,
perched on the edge of Lake Titicaca by the Peruvian border, and Atocha, in
the heart of Bolivia’s southern mining country in Potosí. Two are in the val-
leys region of Bolivia between the altiplano and the eastern plain: Sucre, the
historic seat of the Spanish audiencia and the country’s constitutional cap-
ital, and Sipe Sipe, just east of Cochabamba, itself known as the “capital of
the valleys.” And three municipalities are in Bolivia’s vast eastern region:
Guayaramerín, a frontier town on the river Mamoré that forms Bolivia’s
northern border with Brazil; Baures, further south and east and also in the
department of the Beni; and Porongo, just off the main road 20 minutes
southwest of Bolivia’s second city of Santa Cruz. The seven are mixed in
terms of population as well, ranging from the tiny Desaguadero and Baures,
with 4,000 and 5,000 inhabitants respectively, through Porongo and
Atocha, all small by Bolivian standards, to Sipe Sipe, Guayaramerín, and Su-
cre, whose populations varying between 20,000 and 153,000 make them
large for Bolivia. In terms of the rural/urban divide the group generally
mirrors the country, with ‹ve rural municipalities ranging in urban share
of the population from 0–43 percent (Desaguadero, Baures, Porongo, Sipe
Sipe, and Atocha); and two highly urban municipalities with 86 percent of
their populations in the city (Sucre and Guayaramerín). Their physical sizes
also vary, from Desaguadero and Porongo, small towns with modest catch-
ment areas, to huge Baures that covers an empty swathe of land, rivers, and
marshes stretching from the main town to the mining communities on the
river Iténez, on the border with Brazil.
In economic and social terms the group is quite varied as well. De-
saguadero and Sipe Sipe, in the more settled Andean region of Bolivia, have
relatively stable mestizo and indigenous populations who speak a mixture
of Spanish with Aymara or Quechua respectively, with Spanish preferred in
town and the indigenous tongue in the countryside. Both are essentially
farming areas, although Desaguadero combines an agricultural hinterland
with a classic border-town economy based on transport and trade. Most
migration is of the young departing for the cities of La Paz or Cochabamba,
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or the fertile lands of the east, and hence the populations of both are rela-
tively ethnically homogeneous. On the far side of the country Baures shares
some of these characteristics, although its agriculture is more cattle-based,
and its mestizaje is of white Spanish-speakers with indigenous speakers of
the Baures dialect. Its location in the Bolivian north and the lack of a pass-
able land route have kept Baures isolated from the rest of the country,
blocking in-migration. Hence its population is a stable mix of a small white
minority with a mestizo- indigenous majority.
Atocha, Porongo, and Guayaramerín, on the other hand, are essentially
immigrant societies, with a majority of their inhabitants born elsewhere
and a dissonant mix of languages, religions, and ethnic groups. Their pop-
ulations have changed dramatically over the past twenty years, to the point
where in the latter two many people from eastern and western Bolivia are
virtually unable to communicate with each other. Other than their hetero-
geneity and demographic instability, however, the three municipalities have
little in common. Atocha is a mining economy bolted onto a subsistence-
level agricultural hinterland, and its migration is mostly of western Boliv-
ians from the departments of Potosí, Oruro, and La Paz. Demographic
movements are highly sensitive to mineral prices, and ›ows of people in
and out in recent years ‹rst slashed the district’s population and then dou-
bled it. In Porongo and Guayaramerín, on the other hand, there is abundant
evidence of the long-term Bolivian pattern of migration from the agricul-
turally poor western highlands to the fertile lowlands of the east. In both,
migrants from other parts of Santa Cruz and the Beni mingle with ex-min-
ers and farmers from the highlands, and the remaining locals struggle to re-
call what their hometown was once like. In economic terms Porongo is
closer to Sipe Sipe, an agricultural district close to a large city, while Gua-
yaramerín is more like Desaguadero, with its border-town economy and a
hinterland of poor farming villages.
The seventh municipality, Sucre, stands apart as by far the largest of the
group and sixth largest in Bolivia, with a service-oriented economy based
on government and the university, and well-established small industries.
Sucre also has a fairly large hinterland extending several hours’ drive to the
north and west, where rural communities practice subsistence farming.
Home to the self-styled bluest-blood descendants of Spanish colonizers,
Sucre’s mix of white, mestizo, and indigenous has become even more het-
erogeneous in recent years as it has been joined by tens of thousands of ex-
miners and farmers from Potosí and Oruro, along with smaller numbers
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from the Bolivian east. These Aymara and Quechua speakers have brought
their native languages into a Spanish-speaking city that traditionally
shunned the Quechua countryside, so adding another layer onto Sucre’s
traditional rural-urban divide. The divide is apparent in Sucre’s index of
Unsatis‹ed Basic Needs1 (UBN), where the value for the city, 0.388, is far su-
perior to the rural value, 0.971. This difference is especially striking as Sucre
has the second-best urban UBN value in the country; indeed, the difference
between Sucre’s urban and rural UBN values, and by implication the dis-
parity between urban and rural provision of basic services, is the largest in
Bolivia. This gap is re›ected, albeit less dramatically, among the other six
municipalities, with urban Guayaramerín and near-urban Atocha register-
ing signi‹cantly lower UBN values than rural Desaguadero, Baures,
Porongo, and Sipe Sipe. Tables 1–7 present a broad array of descriptive sta-
tistics for the seven municipalities.
Last, the political complexion of municipal government in our districts
is quite telling. Only three of the seven respected the political alliances that
dominated national politics at the time: Sucre, where the mayor was sus-
tained by a political coalition that re›ected the 1993–97 national govern-
ment, and Sipe Sipe and Baures, run by parties of the opposition (which as-
sumed power in 1997). Each of the other four municipalities was run by
coalitions that in one way or another spanned the national government-op-
position divide. This suggests that local politics in these municipalities was
not subordinate to national political strategies but rather responded indi-
vidually to local conditions and local imperatives. I return to this point in
greater detail below.
This chapter will not employ the high level of descriptive detail de-
ployed in chapters 2 and 3, preferring a more conceptual and analytic ap-
proach. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The second
section reviews how municipal government has changed in the seven dis-
tricts since decentralization, both administratively and in terms of policy
outputs, and considers how successful these changes have been. The next
one examines the social, economic, and political factors that underlie local
governance, focusing on their most salient features. The fourth examines
how these factors combine to produce the institutions of local government,
and hence the quality of the local governance system. The ‹fth section sum-
marizes the analysis, highlighting notable comparisons and drawing lessons
from the outliers. The last section modi‹es the model in light of the analy-
sis and concludes.
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General
Total Population 5,133
Urban Populationc 0
Urban Share 0%
Rural Communities 5
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.913
(UBN)
Urban UBN —
Rural UBN 0.913
Oversight Committee
Total Members 4
Village Members 3
President is from? Rural
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb ADN-MIR
% Vote 1995 53%
Main Opposition MNR
% Vote 1995 41%
Electoral Absenteeism 24%
% Blank Votes 1%
% Null Votes 2%
Municipal Employees
1997 7
1993 4
Increase 75%
Per 1,000 population 1.4
Top Salarya Bs. 1,500
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 93%
Native Tongue 0%
Spanish and Native 5%
Literacy Rate 87%
No Ed. Attainment 11%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 14
Total Students 1,733
Students/Teacher 20.2
Uses Formal Health Care 
System 91%
Number of Health Facilities 3
Malnutrition Rates
Low 20%
Moderate 8%
Severe 1%
TABLE 1. Baures—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
General
Total Population 8,272
Urban Populationc 0
Urban Share 0%
Rural Communities 29
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.928
(UBN)
Urban UBN —
Rural UBN 0.928
Oversight Committee (OC)
Total Members 4
Village Members 3
President is from? Rural
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb MNR-
ADN-MIR
% Vote 1995 79%
Main Opposition None
% Vote 1995 —
Electoral Absenteeism 28%
% Blank Votes 2%
% Null Votes 3%
Municipal Employees
1997 12
1993 1
Increase 1,100%
Per 1,000 population 1.5
Top Salarya Bs. 1,300
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 82%
Native Tongue 2%
Spanish and Native 15%
Literacy Rate 84%
No Ed. Attainment 13%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 31
Total Students 2,209
Students/Teacher 21.9
Uses Formal Health Care 83%
System
Number of Health Facilities 8
Malnutrition Rates:
Low 16%
Moderate 5%
Severe 2%
TABLE 2. Porongo—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
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General
Total Population 153,153
Urban Populationc 131,769
Urban Share 86%
Rural Communities 103
Indigenous Communities 1
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.467
(UBN)
Urban UBN 0.388
Rural UBN 0.971
Oversight Committee (OC)
(Sucre has separate urban and 
rural OCs.)
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb MNR-MBL-
UCS-IU
% Vote 1995 69%
Main Opposition MIR
% Vote 1995 8%
Electoral Absenteeism 29%
% Blank Votes 2%
% Null Votes 3%
Municipal Employees
1997 361
1993 520
Decrease –31%
Per 1,000 population 2.4
Top Salarya Bs. 4,891
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 32%
Native Tongue 11%
Spanish and Native 52%
Literacy Rate 49%
No Ed. Attainment 41%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 74
Total Students 47,211
Students/Teacher 15.2
Uses Formal Health Care 81%
System
Number of Health Facilities 126
Malnutrition Rates
Low 18%
Moderate 5%
Severe 1%
TABLE 3. Sucre—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
General
Total Population 12,216
Urban Population 5,275
Urban Share 43%
Rural Communities 0
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.555
(UBN)
Urban UBN 0.499
Rural UBN 0.605
Oversight Committee (OC)
Total Members 6
Village Members 4
President is from? Rural
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb MNR-UCS-
ADN
% Vote 1995 74%
Main Opposition None
% Vote 1995 —
Electoral Absenteeism 55%
% Blank Votes 4%
% Null Votes 5%
Municipal Employees
1997 9
1993 5
Increase 80%
Per 1,000 population 0.7
Top Salarya Bs. 800
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 29%
Native Tongue 4%
Spanish and Native 64%
Literacy Rate 85%
No Ed. Attainment 14%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 20
Total Students 3,552
Students/Teacher 18.6
Uses Formal Health Care 
System 74%
Number of Health Facilities 13
Malnutrition Rates
Low 30%
Moderate 13%
Severe 3%
TABLE 4. Atocha—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
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General
Total Population 4,337
Urban Populationc 0
Urban Share 0%
Rural Communities 32
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.927
(UBN)
Urban UBN —
Rural UBN 0.927
Oversight Committee (OC)
Total Members 4
Village Members 2
President is from? Town
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb UCS-
Condepa
% Vote 1995 45%
Main Opposition MNR
% Vote 1995 26%
Electoral Absenteeism 34%
% Blank Votes 1%
% Null Votes 2%
Municipal Employees
1997 (full-time) 18
1993 (full-time) 14
Increase 29%
Per 1,000 population 4.2
Top Salarya Bs. 700
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 6%
Native Tongue 20%
Spanish and Native 72%
Literacy Rate 68%
No Ed. Attainment 27%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 13
Total Students 1,123
Students/Teacher 14.4
Uses Formal Health Care 
System 28%
Number of Health Facilities 1
Malnutrition Rates
Low 18%
Moderate 5%
Severe 1%
TABLE 5. Desaguadero—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
General
Total Population 32,273
Urban Population 27,706
Urban Share 86%
Rural Communities 23
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.659
(UBN)
Urban UBN 0.627
Rural UBN 0.978
Oversight Committee (OC)
Total Members 10
Village Members 8
President is from? City
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb MNR-ADN
% Vote 1995 70%
Main Opposition MBL
% Vote 1995 10%
Electoral Absenteeism 48%
% Blank Votes 1%
% Null Votes 1%
Municipal Employees
1997 50
1993 30
Increase 67%
Per 1,000 population 1.5
Top Salarya Bs. 4,360
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 85%
Native Tongue 0%
Spanish and Native 5%
Literacy Rate 92%
No Ed. Attainment 8%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 80
Total Students 16,910
Students/Teacher 30.5
Uses Formal Health Care 
System 86%
Number of Health Facilities 7
Malnutrition Rates
Low 21%
Moderate 7%
Severe 2%
TABLE 6. Guayaramerín—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
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Bonus Web Chapter 9
Local Government after Decentralization
Decentralization brought about signi‹cant changes in the ‹nances, admin-
istration, and policy priorities of our seven districts. But these changes were
not uniform across the group. The municipal budgets and staf‹ng of the
smaller, less established districts grew spectacularly after 1994, while the
older and more settled ones saw smaller gains. The Law of Popular Partici-
pation (LPP) increased central-local devolutions for all municipalities in
Bolivia,2 and hence all municipalities saw their budgets rise. But in smaller
districts with fewer sources of revenue these increases were enormous.
Thus Baures’s budget grew 10 times, Atocha’s and Porongo’s grew 23 and 24
times respectively, and Sipe Sipe’s growth was technically in‹nite.3 Districts
with sources of their own revenues before decentralization, on the other
hand, saw increases that—while signi‹cant—were more modest: 470 per-
cent in Guayaramerín, 138 percent in Desaguadero, and 40 percent in Su-
cre.4 Municipal staf‹ng levels show a similar pattern before and after 1994.
The poorer, more tenuous districts saw increases in personnel that ranged
from 62 percent in Sipe Sipe to 80 percent in Atocha and an impressive 1,100
General
Total Population 19,132
Urban Population 2,033
Urban Share 11%
Rural Communities 7
Indigenous Communities 0
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.815
(UBN)
Urban UBN 0.659
Rural UBN 0.834
Oversight Committee (OC)
Total Membersd 4
Village Members 2
President is from? Town
Electoral
Governing Coalitionb Condepa-
MIR
% Vote 1995 42%
Main Opposition MNR
% Vote 1995 19%
Electoral Absenteeism 36%
% Blank Votes 3%
% Null Votes 4%
Municipal Employees
1997 21
1993 13
Increase 62%
Per 1,000 population 1.1
Top Salarya Bs. 1,000
Qualifs. Req’d? No
Social Indicators
% of Population Speaks
Spanish 7%
Native Tongue 21%
Spanish and Native 69%
Literacy Rate 73%
No Ed. Attainment 24%
Number of Schools (bldgs.) 25
Total Students 3,685
Students/Teacher 16.0
Uses Formal Health Care 
System 74%
Number of Health Facilities 8
Malnutrition Rates
Low 22%
Moderate 9%
Severe 3%
TABLE 7. Sipe Sipe—Descriptive Statistics
Source: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute of Statistics, author’s interviews.
aHighest-paid nonelected official.
bIn order of importance, 1995–99.
cTown’s population is below the urban threshold.
dOC then in transition.
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percent in Porongo, which before decentralization “had only one municipal
employee, the chief municipal of‹cer, who did everything.”5 Desaguadero’s
payroll, by contrast, rose just 29 percent, and Sucre’s actually fell by one-
third. Last, the salaries municipalities paid their employees re›ected this di-
vide as well, staying roughly constant in Desaguadero and Sucre, doubling
in Guayaramerín, and rising by considerably more in the rest.6
It is reasonable that the group would divide on these criteria between
places where functioning municipal institutions predate the LPP and places
where they only sprang into being in 1994. In the former, “old” municipali-
ties, local taxes had long permitted governing institutions to operate and
provide public services, and hence the changes decentralization catalyzed,
while not unimportant, were incremental.7 The “new” municipalities, by
contrast, essentially lacked local government before decentralization, and
hence the reform marked a revolution in their local affairs.8 It is interesting
to note that the one municipality that did not exist at all before decentral-
ization—Baures, previously an agency of the municipality of Magdalena—
did not register the largest budgetary and payroll increases. That honor was
taken by Porongo, followed by Atocha. This is an indication of just how des-
perate the state of many of Bolivia’s small, rural municipalities was. Al-
though these districts existed in theory, many of them—like Baures—may
as well not have existed at all.
It is particularly interesting to consider the municipalities’ hiring prac-
tices and the technical competence of their staff in this light. That new mu-
nicipalities did not enforce quali‹cation requirements for their personnel is
not surprising. Their history was of struggling to ‹nd individuals to act as
mayor or chief municipal of‹cer with no administrative support and a
salary that—in the best of circumstances—was risible. When the opportu-
nity to hire a full complement of staff at realistic salaries arose, the local la-
bor force was generally too small and unskilled to allow a careful selection
of employees according to strict technical criteria. Hence mayors hired as
opportunities arose, and there was a strong component across all four of
“doing their best” under heavy constraints.9 The old municipalities, on the
other hand, already bene‹ted from established bureaucracies, relatively
high staf‹ng levels, and a local pool of quali‹ed labor. With new resources
at their disposal, and given the extra responsibilities decentralization im-
posed, one might expect them to have implemented a more rigorous policy
of hiring by quali‹cations. But none of the three did so. In fact their per-
sonnel policies were worse than neutral in this respect, as all three operated
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quota systems whereby staff were chosen by ruling political parties accord-
ing to their electoral strength.10
The results, not surprisingly, were poor. Whereas local observers and
grassroots leaders in the new municipalities reported improvements in the
quality of municipal employees since 1994, their peers in Sucre and Gua-
yaramerín did not.“The municipality is more a political than a technical in-
stitution,” said Sucre’s general secretary. “There are no educational require-
ments and lots of political pressure. Lots of [our] people are unprepared 
. . . it’s a disaster.”11 Respondents in Desaguadero went further still, testify-
ing that the municipal administration had actually worsened during this
period. In the words of the mayor, municipal employees “were more capa-
ble and better paid before.”12 This begs the question of how political quotas
arose in these districts. Quotas may have been the coincidental result of
idiosyncrasies in each of these three municipalities, or they might be related
systematically to their “oldness,” some formalization of political bargaining
arising out of repeated interactions.
Decentralization also brought about signi‹cant changes in public in-
vestment in the seven municipalities. Consider ‹gures 1–7, which compare
public investment under central government during the last three years be-
fore decentralization with that of local government during the ‹rst three
years after. Most striking is that central government invested nothing at all
in three of the municipalities—Atocha, Desaguadero, and Sipe Sipe—and
in Baures invested only in transport. After decentralization, by contrast, the
four carried out a varied menu of investment projects, in concert with the
other three. Also compelling is the shift away from economic and urban in-
frastructure, which dominated investment pre-decentralization, in favor of
human capital investment. Indeed, before 1994 energy, transport, and ur-
ban development accounted for 78 to 100 percent of investment in three of
the four municipalities that received any. After 1994, local governments’ in-
vestments in education, water, and health accounted for 70 percent or more
of public investment in four districts, and between 41 and 51 percent in two
others. Only in Sucre, curiously, did human capital investment remain low.
But variations in priorities are also evident among the decentralized
governments. Focusing on investment after 1994, we see systematic differ-
ences between large and small municipalities’ use of public resources. The
large districts13 in the group, Sucre, Guayaramerín, and Sipe Sipe, invest
much less in human capital: only 35 percent of their portfolio on average
versus 71 percent for small districts. Conversely, large municipalities invest
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Fig. 1. Public investment in Baures. (Data from Baures municipal budget and Vice
Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.)
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Fig. 3. Public investment in Sucre. (Data from Sucre municipal budget and Vice
Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.)
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Fig. 4. Public investment in Atocha. (Data from Atocha municipal budget and Vice
Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.)
Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in Bolivia 
Jean-Paul Faguet 
http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=175269 
University of Michigan Press, 2012
C
e
n
tr
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
U
rb
a
n
 D
e
v
W
a
te
r 
&
 S
a
n
T
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
re
H
e
a
lt
h
O
th
e
r
0
20
40
Share of 
Budget
Sector
Fig. 5. Public investment in Desaguadero. (Data from Desaguadero municipal bud-
get and Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.)
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budget and Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance.)
Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in Bolivia 
Jean-Paul Faguet 
http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=175269 
University of Michigan Press, 2012
Bonus Web Chapter 15
three times as much as small ones on urban development: 49 percent versus
16 percent. Among those that received no investment before decentraliza-
tion, investment after is also concentrated in human capital in the range of
51–74 percent of their portfolios versus 12–39 percent in urban projects and
less for economic infrastructure. These magnitudes imply that human cap-
ital was the top priority of the worst-off municipalities in Bolivia—the
smallest, poorest, and most rural that were traditionally ignored by the
state. This is consistent with the ‹ndings of chapter 1, which concluded that
it was the policy priorities of precisely these districts that drove national
changes in investment patterns after decentralization. By contrast central
government, which faced no external restrictions on its choice of invest-
ments, chose to focus instead on infrastructure projects in the cities.
Given such large differences among the seven municipalities’ adminis-
trations and policy decisions, it is important to ask, How satis‹ed were the
inhabitants of each? Were local governments open to their opinions and
participation? What did they think of the public services they received, and
in what regard did they hold town hall? The information from six months
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of ‹eldwork is abundant in this respect, and revealing. Top marks among
civic leaders; grassroots respondents; business, union, and religious author-
ities; and other local notables clearly go to the youngest municipal govern-
ment of the bunch, Baures. The quality of its investment projects and the
public services it provides was judged “good” or “very good” by all of the re-
spondents I spoke to, a standard that none of the others approached.14 Its
investment planning system was based on village-level assemblies that dis-
cussed and approved project requests, on which local government then
based its Annual Operating Plan (AOP). These meetings were reported to
be extremely open and participatory—“even animals can attend,” in the
words of one respondent15—and won the broad approval of the local pop-
ulation. And the mayor and municipal council were deemed of high quality
and eager to serve their jurisdiction. “Here they work well and the people
are content with them,” the leader of Jasiakiri said of the council. “They’re
with the people.”16 Several respondents from both town and countryside
testi‹ed approvingly that town hall had so far favored rural farmers, “as
they have the greatest needs and are in the majority here,”17 and not cattle
ranchers or miners, whose needs were less pressing. Baureños’ contentment
with their municipal government stood in stark contrast to their denuncia-
tion of the previous one, based in Magdalena, of which they were then a
part. There was a broad consensus in Baures that Magdalena had ignored
their needs and given them nothing, and had run an untransparent admin-
istration that was possibly corrupt. Self-government, they testi‹ed, had
solved these problems.
Second place in terms of popular satisfaction goes jointly to Porongo
and Sucre. Most of their investment projects were described by respondents
as “good” or “regular,” with the balance of opinion favoring “good.” It is no-
table, however, that rural communities’ appraisals in Sucre were signi‹-
cantly lower than those of urban communities. The planning processes of
both districts were described as reasonably open in principle but in practice
susceptible to personal in›uences or the capriciousness of municipal
of‹cers. For example, Sucre uses a well-designed participative planning sys-
tem in which project ideas rise from the neighborhood/community level
through multiple stages of discussion and approval to city hall, where they
are screened by technicians for feasibility, cost, and overall consistency. The
resulting draft AOP then goes back down to the local level in its entirety to
repeat the process of discussion and modi‹cation. But despite this exhaus-
tively participative protocol, local government used its technical oversight
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to alter or ignore some communities’ requests, telling Chuqui-Chuquí,
nonsensically,“not to request a dike or water project because those were not
in the AOP.”18 And in Porongo, the president of the oversight committee
(OC) reported that several farming communities had changed their project
requests during preparation of the 1996 AOP, in order to conform to an
of‹cial list of “acceptable projects.”19
Both municipalities had mixed but ultimately positive opinions of their
municipal executive, and low opinions of their municipal councils.
Porongo’s mayor was praised for his effort and good intentions in traveling
throughout the district to meet the people. But many opined that his techni-
cal staff were of poor quality. And they singled out the municipal council for
censure as highly politicized individuals most of whom lived in Santa Cruz,
making them unresponsive to local needs. By contrast Sucre’s urban major-
ity seemed reasonably content with the quality of government they received,
though they similarly reproached the municipal council as placeholders who
obeyed their parties and ignored voters. But rural sucrenses denounced city
hall for betraying them, declaring their condition to be the same or worse
than before decentralization. “Up to now we’ve had nothing from popular
participation,” said Chuqui-Chuquí.20 “It doesn’t respond to need locally.
First one comes [from city hall] and says there’s money for us, then another
comes and reduces the amount, and in the end there’s nothing.”21
Atocha occupies third place alone, with highly dispersed opinions of its
investments and public services. Most opinions were clustered between
“good” and “bad,” but collectively covered the entire range. There seems to
be no pattern to respondents’ judgments between town and countryside, or
farming versus mining communities. Atocha’s planning regime was quite
open and participative, and in fact seemed to re›ect local inputs more faith-
fully than Sucre’s or Porongo’s, although the mayor did push to secure the
approval of a fairly large pet project in de‹ance of local demands in 1997.22
Regarding the performance of the local executive branch, atocheños were
reticent, referring more generally to the changes decentralization had
wrought. But the general perception seemed to be that town hall, while bet-
ter than before, was still not good enough, especially as it ignored some
rural communities entirely. “We’ve seen little change here,” reported
Chorolque, “but it was worse before.” Although the mayor was regarded as
well-meaning and reasonably competent, his municipal council was judged
ignorant, uninterested, and ineffectual. Its president, one observer men-
tioned with contempt, did not know how to read.23 Surprisingly, a number
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of respondents testi‹ed that the council had been even more politicized in
previous years and was forced to improve by the OC.
Desaguadero, Guayaramerín, and Sipe Sipe collectively bring up the
rear. Like Atocha, popular verdicts on their investments and public ser-
vices were dispersed over the entire range of possibilities, though most
vary from “bad” to merely “regular.” It is striking that planning procedures
in all three cases were largely closed to popular input, dominated by mu-
nicipal staff. While some projects did originate in community ideas, oth-
ers did not, and communities had little or no say in project planning or
execution, and no recourse for altering of‹cial plans. One technical of‹cer
in the municipality of Guayaramerín told me,“We reformulate the AOP as
we see ‹t. We don’t consult grassroots organizations because they bitch
too much. We know we should, but we don’t.”24 In Sipe Sipe the commu-
nity of Siquisiquía wanted a well but had to settle for a school when gov-
ernment refused to fund the former.25 Not surprisingly, popular assess-
ment of the institutions of local government was poor in all three
districts. It was worst in Sipe Sipe, where the previous mayor, under pres-
sure to resign, switched jobs with the president of the municipal council.
But popular opinion was not satis‹ed, and grassroots organizations
forged a consensus to rescind their recognition of the oversight commit-
tee, which was seen as partial to the mayor, in order to appoint a new OC
to investigate the new mayor. The leader of Mallco Rancho explained that
their intention was to cause the suspension of central-government trans-
fers in order to force him from power.26
Opinions in Guayaramerín were mixed. In the city, in the wake of a pre-
vious mayor widely considered corrupt and ineffective, people suspended
judgment as they waited to see what the current one might accomplish. In
the countryside, however, community leaders attacked the mayor for
grossly favoring the city at their expense. But it was Desaguadero that had
the most curious assessment. There urban opinion was that the municipal-
ity was marginally acceptable because it invested large sums in the country-
side. But rural communities accused the mayor of depriving them of all re-
sources and denying them political voice. Last, the municipal councils of all
three districts were widely held in very low esteem as politicized, unrespon-
sive institutions. And the councilmen of Sipe Sipe and Guayaramerín, in
particular, were generally considered corrupt. “The municipal council,” ob-
served the director of the Guayaramerín Hospital, “is worthless.”27 Table 8
summarizes popular perceptions of municipal performance.
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Economics, Politics, Society
What patterns can we glean from the successes and failures of our seven
municipalities? How can such large differences in local government effec-
tiveness be accounted for? I maintain that an explanation based on the
quality of local government institutions focuses only on apparent reasons.
More fundamental causes lie deep in the interactions of the local economy,
political dynamics, and social structure of each municipality. We take each
in turn.
The Local Economy
The seven municipalities present a broad range of economic interests and
structures, summarized in table 9. As we shall see, though, economic struc-
ture alone is insuf‹cient to explain their divergence in local government
performance.
Chapter 6 found that economic hegemony, or monopsony in the supply
of money to the local political system, tends to reduce competition among
political parties and therefore political oversight of the institutions of local
government. An open and competitive local economy, on the other hand,
foments competition in politics, thereby increasing the diversity of ideas
and policies that compete for public favor. This section examines the local
economic structure of our seven municipalities.
TABLE 8. The Perceived Quality of Local Government
Investment
Local Government
Project Project
Performanced
Rank Municipality Ratingsa Planningb Rural Urban/Town
1 Baures Good–Very Good Very Open Good–Much Improved
2 Porongo Good Fairly Open Good Mayor, Poor Council
Sucre Good Open but Arbitrary Bad Mediocre
3 Atocha Good–Bad Open but Distorted Mediocre–Not Good Enough
4 Desaguadero Regular–Bad Closed Bad Mediocre
Guayaramerín Regular–Bad Closed Bad Mediocre
Sipe Sipe Regular–Bad LG-Dominatedc Bad
Source: Author’s interviews, observation, and other fieldwork.
aMost common ratings as given by communities and grassroots leaders.
bDegree of openness to local ideas, needs, and participation.
cLG = local government.
dAs rated by communities and grassroots leaders; urban/rural differences noted where relevant.
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Our seven cases include a wide variety of economic activities. Baures,
Porongo, and Sipe Sipe are all farming communities. The mainstay of the
inhabitants of Sipe Sipe is subsistence or near-subsistence agriculture on
family plots, with no large landowners surviving the agrarian reform. “The
hacienda was bought out in 1953,” the leader of Parotani, Sipe Sipe, ex-
plained.28 Porongo is also a district of small farmers but with higher levels
of production that allow them to sell food to the city. Baures adds a cattle
economy of 35,000 head to a similar agricultural base. The few large farms
in the district belong to ranchers based in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Trinidad,
and Baures’s remaining ranchers are medium-sized to small, making it sim-
ilar to the other two.29,30 Baures, too, once had large landowners whose
farmworkers were virtual slaves.31 But they entered a decline in the 1970s
and eventually died out. Partly as a result, land is not a source of social
con›ict. In a sparsely populated district, land is in abundance, easily avail-
able, and there is little competition for it.32 In all three districts the towns
primarily support the farming economy through commerce and agricul-
tural services, and are essentially devoid of all other industry.
Porongo stands out, however, due to its proximity to Bolivia’s second
city and its most dynamic, fastest- growing business center, Santa Cruz. The
long-term agricultural decline that operated in Charagua affected Porongo
as well, where falling food prices and the development of the urban econ-
omy reduced the appeal of inheriting the farm as it increased the luster of
an urban, professional life. But because of its location, the outcome in
Porongo was diametrically opposed to that of Charagua. Here the sons of
wealthy landowners, who migrated to the city for their educations and then
TABLE 9. The Local Economy
Rank Municipality Principal Sectorsa Size of Leading Actors
1 Baures Cattle, Agriculture Medium/Small
2 Porongo Agriculture, City Medium
Sucre (rural) Agriculture Small
(urban) Services, Small Industry Medium/Small
3 Atocha Mining, Agriculture Small
4 Desaguadero Transport, Trade and Agriculture Medium/Small
Guayaramerín Transport, Trade, Industry, Large
Commerce, Agriculture and 
Timber
Sipe Sipe Agriculture Small
Source: Author’s interviews, observation, and other fieldwork.
aIn rough order of importance.
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careers, stayed close enough to maintain weekend houses in the town and a
strong interest in its affairs. Through their wealth and social position they
were able to dominate local politics despite their urban residences and oc-
cupations. Hence a district made up of a single, rural economy with few dif-
ferences between town and countryside, where a commonality of economic
interest should have prevailed, was captured by a wealthy enclave that
served as a vector to import the concerns and priorities of the city into its
midst. This had, as we shall see below, decisive effects on its politics and
government.
Sucre, Guayaramerín, and Desaguadero present a different case of more
complex economies, where an agricultural hinterland coexists with an in-
dustrial-commercial hub. Despite being at opposite extremes of the size
distribution, Sucre and Desaguadero share the characteristic of combining
a modern, urban market economy with a rural sector of subsistence agri-
culture. In Desaguadero the urban economy is dominated by transport and
trade with neighboring Peru, with some 300 vehicles per day passing
through the town, most of them high-capacity trucks.33 This traf‹c gener-
ates signi‹cant revenues for the municipality, and control of local govern-
ment is lucrative. The small town’s economy revolves around truck owners,
truck drivers, and the businesses that serve them. Economic actors are
mainly small, and there are no large owners. Desaguadero’s farmers, on the
other hand, work small plots and do not grow for export. The town’s eco-
nomic links are therefore stronger with the La Paz–El Alto conurbation
than with the villages that stretch outward to the south and east. The fact
that trade depends on the relative fortunes of Bolivia and Peru—two very
volatile economies in recent years—serves to strengthen the town’s focus
across the border, away from its hinterland.
In Sucre, the city is largely a service economy, dominated by the institu-
tions of national and departmental government, and the large, very old,
and prestigious Universidad Mayor y Ponti‹cia San Francisco Xavier. Its
biggest industrial concern, the cement company Fancesa, is a public ‹rm
co-owned by the university, the prefecture, and the municipality. After
these, Sucre’s most important economic institutions are its chocolatiers, hat
makers, and tanneries, none of them large. “Sucre was founded for bureau-
cratic reasons, not economic ones,” the chamber of commerce’s directors
elaborated, “because the wives of the Spanish died giving birth in Potosí.”34
It was once run by a mining and landowning oligarchy, according to the dis-
trict director of education, but the revolution of 1952–53 ended that, and
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there have been no dominant economic interests since.35 Today the coun-
tryside is made up of poor family farms that grow potatoes, wheat, and corn
in the dry hills of Chuquisaca. With little surplus production, the cash
economy is fragile, and trade with the city is small. In both municipalities
the two economies, rural and urban, are internally homogeneous, charac-
terized by small to medium-sized actors and no dominant (private) inter-
ests. But there is little to connect them, and they coexist side by side, barely
interacting.
Guayaramerín consists of a highly urbanized municipality with an ex-
tensive rural hinterland that, alone among our group, makes up a single
agribusiness economy. Like Desaguadero, it has the transport and trade-
based economy of a frontier town. But unlike it, Guayaramerín also bene‹ts
from large agricultural enterprises, including almond, Brazil nut, and
heart-of-palm packagers/exporters, cattle ranchers, loggers, and timber
merchants, as well as a signi‹cant retail sector that exploits exchange-rate
movements between the boliviano and the real. This last crosses the barrier
of legality, running to drugs and contraband. The nature of these businesses
implies that the urban and rural economies are intertwined: wealthy busi-
nessmen have large rural landholdings and employ many villagers, and the
economic conditions that large and small actors face—affected by weather,
disease, and infrastructure among other causes—are often the same. Unlike
Sucre and Desaguadero, however, Guayaramerín’s economy is dominated
by a small group of powerful businessmen who collectively own much of
the local economy and all of its large businesses. Some of the strongest
among them are timber merchants and cattle ranchers, who also control
the local political parties and through them local government, treated in
more detail below. The most important two businessmen, “Cacho” and
“Gigi,” were locked in a battle for in›uence that is typical of the dominance
of the business elite to which they belong. Hernán “Cacho” Vargas Rivera is
the most powerful businessman in Guayaramerín, with Brazil nut, heart-
of-palm, and river and land transport companies, two television stations,
and 140,000 hectares of land in Pando.36 His rival, Adrián “Gigi” Rivera, is a
hotel owner, president of the local electricity cooperative, and moneylender
at rates of 5–7 percent per month.37 Their names came up often in my in-
terviews throughout the district when respondents were asked “who runs
the show.”38 While Cacho attempted to gain control of municipal policy via
the local Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) party, which he leads,
Gigi refused to lend the electricity cooperative $37,000 unless the munici-
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pality agreed to assume the debt, thus ensnaring it in his web. Though Ca-
cho raged against this “scandal,” he also admitted that, in his view, “the mu-
nicipality has become an instrument” of powerful interests in Gua-
yaramerín.39
Last of all is Atocha, where the economy is cleanly divided into two
more or less equal parts: mining and subsistence agriculture. The former is
centered on a number of mining communities40 made up of rows of small
huts with few or no basic services, a level of deprivation that resembles
Atocha’s rural villages. At each one the miners are organized in a loose co-
operative and work individually or in teams in narrow, often dangerous
stretches of tunnel. “The cooperative no longer has the solidarity it once
did,” the parish priest lamented. “Before everyone earned the same wage,
but now each miner is left to his fortune.”41 By 1997 miners had fallen a long
way since the heyday of Comibol42 and the COB,43 when the two organiza-
tions in essence ran Atocha. No large miners were left, and the district’s
leading ‹gures were the rich townsfolk, many of them alcohol and coca
salesmen, and its politicians, often the same individuals. These changes
notwithstanding, miners retained a higher capacity to mobilize than any
other group in Atocha. With their tradition of militancy and a strong orga-
nization, they were quick to march on the town to defend their interests if
necessary, as the mayor had discovered more than once.44 The other, agri-
cultural economy was organized around the small, low-yielding family
farms typical of the altiplano; as elsewhere, large landowners had not sur-
vived agrarian reform. This economy did not grow so much as persist in the
high altitude of Atocha, weakly linked to the mining and urban sectors and
largely ignored by the town. Atocha itself was the commercial center where
mineral traders and other mining services, as well as more general com-
merce, were based. Its fortunes were largely dependent on the mines, and it
naturally looked to them in search of its future.
The Local Political System
Table 10 summarizes our districts’ political characteristics.
Chapter 6 found that a vigorous and competitive local politics, marked
by political entrepreneurship and policy innovation, was necessary for ef-
fective local government. It listed three conditions for this to obtain: (1) an
open and transparent political system, (2) a competitive party regime, and
(3) a substantive focus on local issues and local people. Of these, the ‹rst
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would seem to be present in the seven cases. Complaints were common in
all of our municipalities about the vituperative nature of political dis-
course: “We’re worse off than before,” reported Mojotoro, Sucre. “Before
there was no politics here. Now they have campaigns and ‹ght for power.”45
But there was a broad consensus everywhere, with the possible exception of
Porongo (see below), that electoral chicanery and intimidation were ills of
the past, and elections were now free and fair. “The elections were clean
here,” said Sucre’s district director of education, in a typical response. “Be-
fore they stuffed ballot boxes—there were many irregularities.”46
The only district with a fully competitive party regime was Baures,
where clearly delineated governing and opposition alliances existed that
mirrored at least in form the national pattern of politics. Local government
was in the hands of an ADN-MIR coalition, and the MNR was in opposi-
tion. Indeed, although politics in such a small population had an undeni-
ably cozy air, and politicians knew each other and their families personally
and well, politics was quite competitive in Baures, with rival blocs vying to
unseat each other in local elections. “There’s a lot of politics in this town,”
said one observer, referring to how party loyalties ran deep in local society.
“Yesterday the people [at the village festival] were absolutely divided by po-
litical party, each off to one side.”47 Not surprisingly, Baures had the lowest
rate of electoral absenteeism among the seven, at 24 percent. Perhaps as a
result, politics was not dominated by powerful economic or other interests
but was open to all and represented a broad range of views. Indeed, in the
previous election the MNR had coopted the indigenous vote Charagua-
TABLE 10. The Local Political System
Interest
Group Electoral Open, Competitive
Rank Municipality Capture? Absenteesim Political System?
1 Baures No Low Yes
2 Porongo Yes Higha No
Sucre No Low/Medium No
3 Atocha No High No
4 Desaguadero Yes Medium No
Guayaramerín Yes High No
Sipe Sipe No Medium Yes, outside MCb
Source: Author’s interviews, observation, and other fieldwork.
aMany adults are unregistered or registered elsewhere: see text.
bCompetitive politics occurs outside the municipal council (MC) and largely outside the party-polit-
ical system: see text.
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style by naming a Baureño to its party list.48 And unlike other municipali-
ties, as we shall see below, municipal councilmen did not cover up each
other’s transgressions; thus two MNR councilmen from the 1995 election
had not yet been recognized, pending allegations against them from the
previous government. But despite political competition that was often
sharp, politicians managed to work relatively smoothly together, and it is
telling that Baures’s worst political con›ict during this period came from
the outside. This happened when the (MNR) prefect unilaterally donated a
generator belonging to the town of Baures to nearby El Cairo when the lat-
ter’s, used to pump water, broke down. The municipal council and over-
sight committee intervened at the scene of a public commotion and pre-
vented him from doing so.49 Their action was widely applauded throughout
the district, even in the village of El Cairo.50
In Sucre, Porongo, and Atocha, by contrast, competition in the local po-
litical system was essentially absent. So disinterested were Sucre’s politicians
in political rivalry that MNR councilmen, upon winning the 1995 local elec-
tion, voted to return the Socialist Vanguard Germán Gutiérrez to the
mayor’s of‹ce, while they, the MBL, and their other electoral allies quietly
split municipal patronage among themselves. Gutiérrez was known as a
competent and honest politician, and the MNR was happy to support such
a front man in order to avoid political strife over municipal power. Politics
in Sucre was not, therefore, a real clash of ideas or opportunity to effect
change, but rather the means by which the political class shared out the
spoils of power among itself. In Atocha politics was less fractious, with three
parties holding 74 percent of the vote, led by the MNR. These three held all
‹ve council seats between them and were all allied in a governing coalition.
The MNR, a party that brought together the miners, peasant smallholders,
and a number of the town’s rich men, considered itself the natural party of
government in this region. And no one was willing to oppose it. Porongo
was more like Sucre, but for quite different reasons. Here a small clique of
urbanites—sons of the town who had left it for the city (see above)—cap-
tured control of local government and used it to further their own, foreign
priorities. As in Atocha, they represented the rich of the town, except that
they did not live in the town.51 This small group of friends referred to them-
selves curiously as los residentes, or more ominously la fraternidad, and were
distributed among all the main political parties in what was in effect, if not
by design, a group strategy for political domination. Once in power they
showed no party discipline and no desire to compete; the MNR mayor gov-
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erned in coalition with the ADN and MIR, and there was no political op-
position. The terms of the local political debate accordingly re›ected not
the problems and interests of most porongueños but rather those of the few
among them who lived in Santa Cruz.
The three municipalities also shared the problem of electoral absen-
teeism in rural areas. In Atocha this was largely due to a lack of
identi‹cation documents among would-be voters in rural areas, com-
pounded by identi‹cation and voter registration drives in the city and en-
virons that never reached most of the district’s villages.52 Hence Atocha’s
urban and surrounding voters had a disproportionate say in its politics at
the expense of the countryside. Sucre’s absenteeism was fairly low in the
city but rose as distance from the center increased. Peri-urban dwellers of-
ten lacked documents or were not registered to vote locally; rural villagers
also lacked identi‹cation and—with no electoral tradition and a city hall
closed to their needs—were uninterested in politics and politicians.53 Thus
the rural- urban gulf that divided Sucre revealed itself in politics as well.
Absenteeism took on a different form in Porongo. There, a number of rural
communities found themselves closer to polling centers in Santa Cruz than
any of Porongo’s three54 and accordingly registered and voted in the former.
Other residents, more typically, lacked the interest or identi‹cation to vote
and did not bother to register. Thus while Porongo’s rate of absenteeism ap-
pears low at 28 percent, its “true” absenteeism was much higher, estimated
by different observers at between 60 percent and 75 percent.55
The effect of high rates of absenteeism was to facilitate the manipula-
tion of electoral results by means that, while perhaps not strictly illegal,
were ethically dubious. Thus in Porongo the mayor cheerfully asked me,
“Do you know how I won the election? I had more trucks than my oppo-
nent!”56 And he burst out laughing. To the extent that he simply provided
local voters with free transport, he was guilty only of a partisan effort to get
out the vote in a district lacking transport. But several observers accused
him and others of trucking in paid “voters” from other municipalities, in
violation of election laws.57 It is not clear that this in fact occurred, al-
though the mayor’s boast provides cause for alarm. If it did, then Porongo
stands out as the exception in our group to increasing electoral trans-
parency. More generally, residentes were resented for bringing their families
from Santa Cruz to vote in Porongo, in an attempt to tip electoral results.58
In such a setting, the ultimate effect of Porongo’s quasi-absentee voters was
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to facilitate the success of such strategies by reducing the overall vote tally,
thus abetting outsiders’ attempts to distort the local political system.59
As a result of these factors, all three municipalities suffered from weak
political accountability.60 In Atocha and Porongo, high absenteeism
sapped the power of elections to elicit information or constrain govern-
ment’s policy decisions; strategic bargaining by councilmen in the indirect
election of Sucre’s mayor produced a similar result there. All three munic-
ipalities lacked the disciplining effect of an active opposition on govern-
ment decisions, with negative consequences for policy-making in each. In-
deed, the only real opposition government faced in Porongo was beyond
party politics, from the (real) residents of Porongo. This was voiced by the
OC, which opposed certain investment projects considered of little bene‹t
to most rural porongueños. Atocha displayed a similar dynamic, in which
an urban political game for control of the municipal apparatus was inter-
rupted episodically by a more raw interaction of miners and municipal au-
thorities in which the former marched, demonstrated, and even took
hostages in support of their demands.61 This was how decisions of local
importance were made in Atocha, punctuating periods of personal and
political harvest for elected of‹cials. Porongo’s OC, starved of funds, per-
sonnel, and bargaining power, was altogether less successful. To try to
overcome this problem, its president proposed a new “microregional”
party to contest local elections on behalf of rural farmers. The MBL, as it
had done in Charagua, accepted.62 But in Sucre neither form of “external”
opposition was present, and politics as a result remained strangely discon-
nected from local society. Perhaps because its urban population was so
much in ›ux, parties did not have strong socioeconomic identities.63 Poli-
tics thus occurred in a sort of gap, an empty space between society and
government where politicians hid, dealing quietly among themselves, with
little incentive to seek change.
Last come Desaguadero, Guayaramerín, and Sipe Sipe, the three worst
performers of our group. All three had medium to high rates of absen-
teeism, between one-third and one-half of the electorate. Guayaramerín,
with the highest rate, suffered what in terms of the model of chapter 6 can
be called a weak relationship in the primary political market for votes. The
people there, a heterogeneous mix resulting from a migratory boom that
lasted two decades, had little tradition of political participation and hence a
weak voting spirit. I return to this point below. In Desaguadero and Sipe
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Sipe, two more demographically settled districts, absenteeism was lower
but still signi‹cant. This was due in large part to such factors as distance
and lack of identi‹cation, especially in rural areas, discussed above.
Perhaps not surprisingly given low voting participation, interest-group
capture af›icted both Guayaramerín and Desaguadero, though not Sipe
Sipe. In the former, money politics was a very strong phenomenon. Promi-
nent businessmen—the spiritual descendants of the cattle barons of the
past—were ‹rmly in control of the major political parties, and through
them local government, using their resources to ‹ght elections and expedite
their political strategies. And once in power, of‹cials and their businesses
pro‹ted from the contracts, contacts, and policy-making powers that local
government afforded to further their business interests. Thus when the
MNR sought to prevent the reelection of Guayaramerín’s longtime ADN
mayor, who had won the popular vote,64 it offered the MBL councilman
$30,000 for his vote. This councilman, an ex-priest of modest means, used
the money to buy a local television station and so became one of Gua-
yaramerín’s media magnates.65 His vote elevated a prominent logging and
timber merchant to the mayoralty of a district that contained large tropical
forests. But it is notable that these political dealings occurred among indi-
viduals much more than among parties. Political alliances were much the
same. Indeed, during my stay the mayor and senior ADN councilman inau-
gurated a new coalition between their respective parties with a karaoke duet
in a local nightclub. This broke up the previous MNR-MBL pact. But the lo-
cal ADN chief was unconvinced. “Ivan [the ADN councilman] and Tico
[the mayor] don’t seem to belong to any party anymore. They’re just look-
ing to accommodate themselves.”66 Political competition in Guayaramerín
was the province of narrow interests—that is, individual businessmen—vy-
ing for control over the machinery of government and its policy-making. It
was not a broader contest of ideas or ideologies, and in it broad collective
interests were essentially unrepresented. Once elected, Guayaramerín’s
politicians were content to ‹nd an accommodation and did little to oversee
or discipline each other’s activity. The fact that they were friends and mem-
bers of the same restricted social set greatly facilitated this process. The fate
of the previous mayor, widely accused of embezzlement but never investi-
gated by the municipal council on which he still sat, was illustrative.67
Desaguadero, by contrast, was politically two separate municipalities—
an urban one where politics happened, and a rural one where it did not. In
a way similar in type, though smaller in scale, to Guayaramerín, urban pol-
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itics in Desaguadero took the form of a contest among a business elite to
hold power and control municipal resources. Once elections were over, the
spoils were divided among the victors, and public life resumed its cozy,
quiet pace. But the fact that the assets of Desaguadero’s biggest business-
men were literally on wheels—they could get into their trucks and drive
away—made them essentially opportunists and not entrenched interests in
the sense of factory or landowners. Partly as a result of this, Desaguadero’s
politics was a less ruthless, less deliberate affair than Guayaramerín’s, largely
free of ideology or broader (national) strategies. With a substantive focus
on patronage, and a mobile, changing elite, the district lacked political
competition because in many ways it lacked substantive politics. Sipe Sipe
went further still along this continuum. Like Desaguadero it had no en-
trenched interests, but unlike it no powerful businessmen either, and hence
no money politics. Despite this the district hosted fairly strong political ri-
valries, with a MIR-Condepa coalition ensconced in town hall, strong MBL
sympathies among community groups, and constant frictions between the
two.68 But somehow this did not translate into substantive competition in
the political realm. The job switch between the mayor and president of the
municipal council showed that local politicians were willing to act dema-
gogically to undermine such mechanisms of accountability. Politicians’ de-
sire to avoid political competition did not entirely sti›e it, however, but
rather relocated it outside the municipal council, in the hands of grassroots
organizations (GROs). Thus the discipline that competing parties might
normally have injected into the political arena was instead provided outside
it when Sipe Sipe’s GROs mobilized to challenge the mayor.
This combination of voter absenteeism and a lack of political competi-
tion led to weak accountability in all three districts, as it had in Atocha,
Porongo, and Sucre, facilitating the self-perpetuation of prominent politi-
cians and amplifying their discretion once in government. In Desaguadero
and Guayaramerín citizens had yet to learn how to use the political system
to enforce accountability on government of‹cials. Sipe Sipe, by contrast,
was in the middle of an experiment in which civic activism attempted to
remedy the problem by challenging its root cause—the political dominance
and manipulations of the Condepa-MIR coalition. By substituting for po-
litical parties, GROs sought to loosen the grip of a small coterie of politi-
cians on their municipal government and so regain control of local affairs.
Unfortunately this research ended before it was clear whether the experi-
ment would succeed or fail.
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It is interesting that there was no evidence of political capture in three
of the six municipalities where political accountability failed. None of
these—Atocha, Sipe Sipe, and Sucre—had interest groups suf‹ciently pow-
erful to dictate to local government. This implies that the dual failure of po-
litical opposition and electoral participation is suf‹cient to undercut ac-
countability in the local political system even in districts that lack dominant
interests, thus leaving municipalities prey to the volition of their leaders.
Not surprisingly, respondents in three of these districts, Sucre, Porongo,
and Guayaramerín, and to a lesser extent Desaguadero as well, reported a
loss of faith in governments that did not answer for their actions, and a loss
of interest in politics. In Sucre the reelection of Gutiérrez, who came in sec-
ond, had caused many voters throughout the district to despair “because
one wins the election but another winds up in power.”69 “The people here
feel that their vote has no value,” added an observer in Guayaramerín. “It’s
all cooked between them [politicians], so why vote?”70 This worsened the
problem of absenteeism, which in turn made it easier for elites to perpetu-
ate themselves and decreased their accountability—a vicious cycle that was
potentially dif‹cult to break.
Civil Society
Table 11 summarizes the districts’ social characteristics.
Chapter 6 conceptualized the role of civil society in local governance as
an institution that aggregates preferences and represents community needs,
TABLE 11. Civil Society
Institutional
Social Encompassing Coherence and
Rank Municipality Heterogeneity Interest Trust Ability (ICA)
1 Baures Low Yes High High
2 Porongo High Yesa Low Low
Sucre High No Low Lowb
3 Atocha Medium No Low Lowc
4 Desaguadero High No Low Lowb
Guayaramerín High Yes Low Low
Sipe Sipe Low Yes High High
Source: Author's interviews, observation, and other fieldwork.
aLatent encompassing interest.
bRural high + urban medium = collectively low.
cRural low + urban medium + mining communities high = collectively low.
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mediates community participation in the production of public services, fa-
cilitates social expression and the assertion of local identity, and enforces
political accountability on the institutions of government. Whatever orga-
nizational form civil society takes—and in Bolivia the distance from min-
ing cooperatives to pre-Conquest ayllus is great—its institutional coher-
ence and ability to mobilize grassroots participation around a particular
goal are fundamental to its ability to participate in the local governance
process. These qualities are in turn dependent upon people’s ability to com-
municate effectively with each other, the degree to which they share inter-
ests and priorities, and ultimately the trust that they invest in their leaders
and in each other. Unfortunately such characteristics are subjective social
traits and thus dif‹cult to measure reliably. Hence this section examines
communities’ ethnic and organizational heterogeneity, and the (objective)
existence of an encompassing socioeconomic interest,71 as proxies for ease
of communication and similarity of social priorities.72 It also uses interview
responses as evidence for the existence of trust. Taken together, these at-
tributes point to levels of institutional ability and coherence that vary
signi‹cantly among our seven civil societies.
With ‹ve rural and three urban GROs, Baures was a compact society
where whites lived largely in town, indigenous people in the countryside,
and mestizos in both. The district had some 720 indigenous residents,73 and
people of mixed race made up the majority. But the social implications of
this ethnic diversity were less than elsewhere in Bolivia due to the greater
degree of assimilation by Baureño natives and mestizos. In linguistic terms,
for example, 93 percent of Baures’s people spoke only Spanish, 5 percent
Spanish plus a native tongue, and 0.1 percent a native tongue only, which is
a stark contrast with Bolivian averages of 32 percent, 19 percent, and 43 per-
cent respectively.74 Baureños’ dress was essentially Western dress, largely
free of distinguishing features such as the multilayered skirts and bowler
hats of the altiplano, and mixed Baureño-Spanish surnames abounded, in-
dicating a high rate of intermarriage. Consistent with this, observers re-
ported smooth social relations among these groups and described Baures as
“paci‹c.” “Here everyone gets along well,” said the nuns from CETHA. “All
participate equally in each other’s feast days.”75 Indeed, the controversy sur-
rounding the generator and the prefect “was the ‹rst time since 1704 that
there was a commotion in the town,” the head of one GRO reported.76
Good social relations can partly be explained by the similar economic
interests of its citizens, whether indigenous, mestizo, or white. As explained
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above, Baures had a single agricultural and cattle economy devoid of in-
dustry, lacking in trade, where small and medium-sized landowners pre-
vailed. Town and countryside faced similar economic incentives, and when
the countryside prospered the town did too. There was, thus, an encom-
passing interest in Baures, and one that expressed itself in a context of so-
cial harmony using a common language, Spanish. This bred a similarity of
outlook that transcended politics and reached down into the social realm;
as their goals were similar, the social organizations they employed to ad-
vance them were similar too. Rural and urban communities alike described
their communities as “grassroots organizations,”77 using the language of the
1994 LPP reform, so eschewing the opposition between “indigenous/origi-
nal communities” and urban “neighborhood councils” common in the rest
of Bolivia. We might expect trust to ›ourish in such a context, and in Bau-
res it did. “The distribution of money is much better now,” said the head of
Jasiakiri’s GRO, explaining that his community was willing to forgo invest-
ments in one year so that resources might ›ow to other communities.“Now
communities take turns to receive investment. It’s good this way.”78 This
leader valued cooperation as such, illustrating an attitude that was common
throughout the district.
With high levels of trust, a clear encompassing interest, and social rela-
tions that were close and smooth, Baures’s civil society boasted a high level
of institutional coherence and the ability to involve the people in their local
government. Its geography may well help to explain these characteristics.
Isolated by large plains that ›ooded half the year, its only reliable link to the
rest of Bolivia was by air. With only 5,133 inhabitants, and outside Bolivia’s
main west-east migratory ›ows, it was made up of a microsociety with its
own rules, traditions, and social patterns of interaction. Its stable popula-
tion changed little from year to year, and its inhabitants knew that con›icts
with their neighbors would not go unnoticed, nor become much diluted.
With only the most limited of outside recourse, Baureños got along because
they had to.
In Atocha, Porongo, and Sucre, by contrast, deep-seated ethnic and cul-
tural differences had signi‹cant implications for the social dynamics and
organizational abilities of civil society. In Sucre the major difference was be-
tween rural and urban sectors. The former was a large but fairly uniform
area of 103 rural communities populated by peasant farmers who spoke
Quechua before Spanish and worked their own land using mainly premod-
ern methods. The latter was a highly urbanized, Spanish-speaking, indus-
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trial and service economy where migration over the past 15 years from the
western highlands, the eastern lowlands, and a large stream of students
from Brazil had relentlessly pushed the city’s boundaries outward and pro-
foundly changed its ethnic composition. This was re›ected in the city’s lin-
guistic makeup, where only 32 percent speak Spanish exclusively, 11 percent
a native language, and 52 percent Spanish plus a native language. Unlike
other Bolivian cities, Sucre lacked strongly marked social strata; the city was
abundant in the middle and working classes, and had almost no rich in-
habitants.79 But the differences between urban and rural Sucre were dra-
matic nonetheless, and the district was essentially two municipalities—one
agricultural and socially homogeneous, the other (post-)industrial and so-
cially mixed.
Like Sucre, Porongo had also seen large in›uxes of migrants during the
past two decades, in this case from Chuquisaca, the valleys of Santa Cruz,
and the western highlands. Although the district was older than the city of
Santa Cruz, most of its rural communities were formed recently by mi-
grants from the west, and social heterogeneity was high. Entire villages of
recently arrived chuquisaqueños alternated on Porongo’s map with villages
of orureños, and others where provenance was mixed. Many recent arrivals
spoke Spanish quite poorly and often had signi‹cant trouble communicat-
ing with each other when their native languages differed. Language barriers
were compounded by differences of attire, diet, and religion, to the point
where porongueños commonly regarded each other as foreign, and mutual
suspicion impeded collective action. This was especially true of the resi-
dentes, whose antipathy toward colla80 migrants exceeded that of the town’s
native inhabitants.
Atocha suffered public divisions of comparable magnitude, though of
a very different character. Local society was divided between cooperativist
mining communities, subsistence farming communities, and a market
town that served both. Each had its own traditions and history, and its own
forms of organization. The population of rural villages was fairly stable:
Quechua-phones who spoke some Spanish, with little in-migration and a
small but steady out›ow. Miners were almost entirely recent migrants
from throughout western Bolivia who preferred Spanish to their native
tongues and were ethnically mixed. And the town, which also preferred
Spanish, contained a signi‹cant ›oating population of traders and sales-
men that waxed and waned as mineral prices rose and fell.81 While town
dwellers organized themselves into long-standing neighborhood councils,
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and mining communities mobilized around the of‹cials of their elected
cooperative, rural farmers had only weakly adopted the local institutions
of the peasants’ union, and a number of villages had no representative in-
stitutions at all.82
The constituent groups in all three districts faced divergent economic
incentives and priorities; in none was there an encompassing interest
around which society could rally. Atocha’s miners depended fundamentally
on the price of minerals for their prosperity, while its farmers operated in a
separate economy with little surplus production and little trade with the
mines or town. The town sold the miners supplies and bought their prod-
uct, and hence shared their interests while largely ignoring the countryside.
The situation was similar in Sucre, where the city’s scale and sophistication
isolated it even more from its rural hinterland. If Atocha turned its back on
the countryside, Sucre was hardly aware that it existed. “The villages—
they’re screwed,” Fancesa’s general manager asserted, “because of their own
characteristics.”83 Only in Porongo were the interests of town and country-
side broadly aligned, despite having the most comprehensively mixed pop-
ulation, across both town and villages, of the three. Here town and country
alike comprised a single, agricultural economy, richer and more fertile than
the other two, which sold its surplus to the nearby city. The town served the
agricultural hinterland, and what was good for the latter was good for the
former. It was thus all the more striking that this latent encompassing in-
terest did not assert itself but was undermined by interloping residentes
with fundamentally different priorities who nevertheless managed to dom-
inate local government.
Unsurprisingly, trust was at a low ebb in all three districts. In Porongo
social differences were simply too great, and the population too unsettled,
for trust to have developed among divergent communities. And in Sucre
the lack of contact between contiguous populations prevented trust from
being born. Urban leaders were largely unaware of the concerns of the vil-
lages, and rural leaders complained that municipal of‹cials refused to see
them when they visited the city.84 But Atocha was the most extreme case,
where a lack of trust between villages and town became active distrust
where mining communities were concerned. At Chorolque, for example,
miners took project evaluators from the Social Investment Fund hostage
for two days, demanding that a delayed water project be approved for con-
struction.85 With a history of militancy and direct political action, Atocha’s
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miners did not believe the assurances of their local and national authorities,
and possessed the means to take matters into their own hands.
With low trust, a subverted encompassing interest, and levels of het-
erogeneity so high that many of its people could not speak to each other,
Porongo’s civil society suffered from institutional weakness and little abil-
ity to mobilize around a goal. Although some of its civic leaders were de-
termined and knowledgeable, the social body had too many cleavages to
coalesce, and as a result lay dormant before local authorities, unable to
initiate policy discussions or defend its interests. In Atocha, the miners
stood alone in their coherence and organization, much more involved in
the selection, design, and execution of public investment projects than
farming or urban communities. Among these three there were low levels
of trust, little interaction, and no encompassing interest. Hence civic mo-
bilizations were of and for miners, and Atochan society as a whole was
dysfunctional. In a broadly similar pattern, Sucre functioned for all in-
tents and purposes as two independent societies, each in its own way in-
ternally consistent. Urban society was able to overcome signi‹cant het-
erogeneity to organize itself reasonably effectively around neighborhood
priorities. Rural society, by contrast, had far fewer social differences and
much stronger institutions. But with low levels of trust between the two
and little in common beyond the municipal budget, their interaction—
such as it existed—took the form of a zero-sum contest for public invest-
ment that urban groups were strongly placed to win. Sucre’s society, as a
collective, was dysfunctional.
Desaguadero and Guayaramerín offer social panoramas similar to the
previous three, while Sipe Sipe stands out for its relative homogeneity. Lo-
cated in the fertile valleys of Cochabamba, Sipe Sipe was an agricultural
municipality centered on a market town. Its population spoke Quechua
and Spanish throughout the district, with no apparent ethnic or cultural di-
vides between town and countryside beyond a tendency to favor Spanish in
the former. Interestingly, the communities of Sipe Sipe assumed similar or-
ganizational forms regardless of whether they were urban or rural. Al-
though local respondents referred to comités cívicos or juntas vecinales in
urban areas and the peasants’ union in the countryside, their underlying
structures were very similar, with secretarios generales for leaders, and
of‹cers elected according to a rotating system throughout. In Desaguadero,
however, the difference between urban and rural communities was
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signi‹cant. The district was composed of eleven rural communities86 where
Aymara and (some) Spanish were spoken, and two urban associations
where Spanish prevailed. Rural communities were organized into either
traditional mallkus originarios or local branches of the peasants’ union, as is
common in the region. Albó et al. describe them this way.
[These institutions] are a form of social expression and a process of collec-
tive decision-making that surprise the outsider with their degree of partic-
ipation and democratic respect. . . . They operate more by consensus than
by majority vote . . . [and have a] highly evolved system of jobs and author-
ities that organize the internal life of the community . . . and assure its ar-
ticulation with society at large.87
The two organizational forms are functionally very similar, as to a great
extent union authorities took on the duties of the preexisting indigenous
authorities during the revolution of 1952–53; name changes were largely se-
mantic, and at the community level the underlying participative social
structures remained.88 Desaguadero’s urban associations, by contrast, fea-
tured leaders elected by majority vote and the hierarchical structures typi-
cal of modern representative democracy. But the difference did not end
there. The town, unusually, was split between two different organizational
forms: a neighborhood council and the Comunidad San Pedro, each com-
prising roughly half its 2,000 inhabitants.89 These structural differences
were re›ected in Desaguadero’s social dynamics. Though they professed to
work well together, distrust was evident between the two communities of
the town. And the subsistence farmers and ‹shermen of Desaguadero’s
rural villagers reported no contact with their urban peers, and no partici-
pation in larger municipal affairs beyond “their” school or water project.90
Meanwhile, urban GROs—heavily involved in municipal business along-
side their local government institutions—were indifferent to the needs of
the villages.91
Guayaramerín was made up of eight rural and two urban GROs, and
though 85 percent of its population claimed Spanish as their language, many
also understood Portuguese. Like Desaguadero, it had the highly mixed pop-
ulation of a thriving border town. But unlike it, Guayaramerín was the prod-
uct of a migratory boom that multiplied its population 13 times during the
previous half-century.92 As a result it was a relatively new town, the sum of
many cultures and ethnic groups, with relatively little unity among its di-
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verse population. “There is mutual tolerance here,” said Sr. Ana of Caritas,
“but the people don’t relate much among themselves. Each group celebrates
its own feast day.”93 It was also a “very complex society,” where enormous
wealth rubbed shoulders with abject poverty,94 and drugs, prostitution, and
alcoholism abounded.95 New social organizations were slow to form in a
context of high demographic ›ux, which provided local politicians with a
valuable opportunity. When community groups ‹nally did organize, it was
at the instigation of local government. But rather than catalyze the sort of
social self-organization that has been the rule throughout Bolivia, the gov-
ernment of Guayaramerín provided a channel for political parties to pene-
trate a weak and easily divisible civil society during GRO formation and so
colonize civic institutions for political ends.96 The secretary of the Chamber
of Commerce described the situation this way.
The GROs are terrible here . . . they’re totally politicized. They make mid-
night deals in search of payoffs. . . . GROs don’t consult their members be-
fore making decisions—rather the leaders meet with the parties, receive
money, and then commit their misdeeds.97
By falling under the sway of the parties, GROs became complicit in the en-
demic corruption of Guayaramerín’s local government. Such collusion was
both a symptom of and contributing factor to the lack of social mobiliza-
tion in Guayaramerín. Had organized civil society preceded politics, it
might not have been coopted so easily or so thoroughly by the parties. In-
stead GROs became political franchises that sti›ed civic participation in
government.“The people are like children here,” the 1o de Mayo community
explained. “They receive a pittance [from local government] and are happy
with that.”98 Lacking an autochthonous organization and excluded by their
civic leaders, the people of Guayaramerín were passive before the govern-
ment they had elected.
Both Guayaramerín and Sipe Sipe bene‹ted from an encompassing in-
terest. Agriculture provided this interest in Sipe Sipe and bound the farm-
ing countryside to its agricultural market town. Good years for the farmers
were good years for the townspeople too, and all tended to bene‹t from the
same policies. The situation was similar in Guayaramerín, where urban and
rural sectors were intertwined in a modern agribusiness economy, as is ex-
plained in detail above. This gave city and countryside similar interests and
facilitated collective action for the progress of the municipality. “The devel-
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opment of this town has been through the money of its own citizens,” re-
ported the parish priest.“They pooled their efforts to form their own water,
telephone, and other cooperatives” in order to provide basic services and
improve the local standard of living.99 These efforts were spearheaded by
the city’s well-organized business elite, which formed a powerful, all-party,
pro-Guayaramerín lobby. They bene‹ted from growth throughout the dis-
trict and hence favored a comprehensive local development. If public ser-
vices were better in richer areas than poorer ones, this was due as much to
the ‹nancial constraints of cooperatives in a context of rapid population
growth as to discrimination by the governing class. By contrast De-
saguadero, with a much smaller and less developed urban center, consisted
of two distinct economies, and hence two separate sets of interests. The
town was dominated by transport and related businesses that serviced the
large volume of trade that daily coursed through it; the countryside hosted
subsistence agriculture that sold little to, or through, the town. Hence while
the villages were turned inward, the town looked out to Peru and La Paz,
and there was no encompassing interest for the two to share.
In questions of trust, Guayaramerín was similar to Porongo, while De-
saguadero was similar to Sucre. Guayaramerín’s migrant peoples were sim-
ply too diverse and too unaccustomed to each other for trust to blossom
among them. And the politicization of its civic institutions served to re-
place the logic of cooperation that operates at their core with a logic of (po-
litical) competition. Thus, on the few occasions when the practice of local
government brought Guayaramerín’s social groups into contact, it was not
so much to organize collective action as to do battle on behalf of their po-
litical patrons. A process that might otherwise have promoted trust served
instead to undermine it further. And in Desaguadero, social and economic
diversity was magni‹ed by isolation. Although they lived next to each other,
its town and village populations had so little contact of any sort that trust
was practically impossible. In Sipe Sipe, on the other hand, the situation
was very different. With a culturally homogeneous and stable population,
and a similar model of social organization throughout the district, the con-
ditions were well established for trust to develop. And the fact that Sipe
Sipe’s GROs were able to coordinate their efforts outside the ambit of for-
mal politics with the aim of overturning a politicized and unpopular mayor
indicates that it did.
High heterogeneity and low levels of trust left society institutionally
crippled in Desaguadero and Guayaramerín. In the latter case, a latent and
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potentially powerful encompassing interest was counteracted through the
active subversion of society’s organizational structure by political parties
intent on widening the sphere of political competition. In the former, civic
institutions with relatively high ability and legitimacy in the countryside,
and medium ability in town, had almost no interactions with each other,
and—devoid of mutual trust—were, like Sucre’s, collectively dysfunctional.
Of the three districts, only Sipe Sipe boasted the conditions necessary for a
coherent and active civil society to emerge. Its younger GROs dated from
the 1950s agrarian reform period, while the older ones trace their history
back to the pre-Conquest villages of the Inca and Tiawanacota civilizations.
With a homogeneous population, widespread civic trust, a clear encom-
passing interest, and strong civic traditions of participation in community
government, Sipe Sipe’s GROs enjoyed high levels of popular legitimacy
and an ability to mobilize residents for collective action. Given this, its rank
among the lowest tier of municipalities is surprising. As we shall see below,
this can be explained in part as a transition dynamic: GROs were still learn-
ing to use the (new) system of municipal government to their advantage,
and once they did the persistence of unresponsive local governments would
become very much more dif‹cult.
The Local Governance System
This section turns to the question of how the economic, political, and social
factors identi‹ed above interact within the con‹nes of the legal-political
framework to determine the quality of local governance. Although these
factors account for the deep logic of local government, they operate
through the proximate causes of governing institutions. Hence this section
will also trace how economics, politics, and society jointly determine the
quality and character of the municipal council, oversight committee, and
the local executive branch (mayor) in each of our seven municipalities.
Baures
Baures was a small, ethnically and culturally homogeneous municipality
where both town and countryside were bound together in a single agricul-
tural and cattle economy. Small to medium-sized farms predominated, and
there were no conspicuously powerful economic interests. Such a small, iso-
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lated district provided its residents with strong incentives to get along, and
life in Baures had a familial, cozy air. Civil society was well organized into ur-
ban and rural community associations that had high organizational ability
and bene‹ted from broad popular legitimacy. As a result, these associations
were able to both involve the people in the governance process and engage
with of‹cial institutions in town on an equal footing. Politics was quite com-
petitive, and party identity was strong, perhaps in part because of a previous
administration widely reviled as corrupt and ineffective. All of these factors
combined to produce a high-quality local governance system that was fo-
cused on voters and responsive to their needs. In terms of the model of chap-
ter 6, there was balance between the political markets for votes and in›uence
and the logic of social representation as mediated by Baures’s civic associa-
tions (see ‹gure 8). The inherent tension between these three elements cre-
ated a self-limiting dynamic in which the pressures of local interest groups
were contained within the bounds of political competition and did not spill
into the machinery of local government or erupt as civil strife. This served to
create responsive institutions of local government.
Thus the municipal council was responsive and highly attuned to local
needs. Respondents af‹rmed that the council met with them regularly, and
commented approvingly of its work with the mayor to solve local problems
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and respond to their demands.100 “The councilmen respond mostly to the
people,” said the leader of El Cairo, echoing the general sentiment. “They
don’t take account of who voted for them and who didn’t, but rather of the
needs of everyone.”101 The mayor, too, was held in high esteem throughout
the district. First elected in 1996, he had been con‹rmed in his post the fol-
lowing year and was judged far superior to his predecessor. Like the coun-
cil, the mayor was credited with planning projects well and distributing
municipal resources equitably, for the ‹rst time including the district’s
small villages.102 Last, the oversight committee was described as well-inten-
tioned and moderately active but lacking the funds to perform its role
properly. “It’s a job that demands a lot, but they aren’t paid anything,” ex-
plained councilman Oni Antelo.103 Nonetheless the OC was credited with
successfully mediating local demands during the yearly budget planning
exercise, and more generally with consulting townspeople and villagers be-
fore acting. Perhaps because of the legitimacy it so generated, the only time
it opposed municipal policy it won.104 Together, these three institutions
produced good-quality local government in Baures that was accountable to
voters and focused on their needs instead of politics,. The generator inci-
dent exempli‹ed this. It is not surprising that baureños were satis‹ed with
the quality of government they received and that they rated public invest-
ment projects highly.
Sucre
Sucre, in comparison a huge, diverse, and highly urbanized district, was in
some ways also a sleepy municipality. Its two major social divisions were:
(1) city versus countryside, and (2) native-born sucrenses versus recent (ur-
ban) immigrants. Civil society in the countryside was well organized by vil-
lage associations, keepers of the traditions and identity of Sucre’s peasant
farmers; city society was organized by neighborhood councils and other
civic associations that, though many were still in the process of formation,
enjoyed reasonable levels of legitimacy among their members. But between
the two there was essentially no contact and very little in common, social,
economic, or otherwise. As an institutional whole, civil society in Sucre did
not work. The local economy was similarly divided between a hinterland of
subsistence agriculture and an urban economy of services and small to
medium-sized industry, with little integration between the two. Surpris-
ingly given its size, the city lacked large ‹rms or other dominant private in-
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terests. To a large extent this was re›ected in Sucre’s politics, which was un-
competitive to the point of being inert. Parties did not represent societal in-
terests or sectors. Rather than compete on ideas in the foreground of mu-
nicipal life, they preferred to remain in the background, carving up of‹cial
patronage among themselves in a broad cohabitation, behind the facade of
a popular mayor from a minor party. With political debate sti›ed, politics
became a cozy enclave from which politicians had little incentive to emerge.
In terms of the model, the cash market for in›uence between parties
and private interests was very weak, while the market for votes was com-
prehensively subverted by a noncompetitive party regime. The division and
weakness of civil society completed local government’s isolation from local
needs and from incentives to meet them. Figure 9 illustrates Sucre’s local
governance system. I leave similar illustrations for the remaining districts to
the reader’s imagination. Together, these factors produced a curious mix of
competence and detachment in city hall. On the one hand, the institutions
of government were isolated by an antidynamic in which no one fought to
control them. But on the other hand, a capable and even sophisticated mu-
nicipal administration toiled at the center of this vacuum to ensure that lo-
cal services never fell below minimally acceptable levels. Perhaps because of
its history as a center of government under both the Spanish and the re-
public, Sucre had developed a tradition of competent municipal adminis-
tration, with well-trained operational of‹cials, some of the best budgeting
and IT systems in Bolivia, and an unusually high rate of local tax collection.
Local government in Sucre was thus a well-maintained but rudderless ship,
drifting without direction.
The municipal council certainly did not provide leadership. Indepen-
dent observers, unenthusiastic about their government, reserved their
greatest scorn for Sucre’s councilmen, who were judged almost universally
to obey their parties and ignore voters. “They are unprofessional and inco-
herent,” reported the manager of FANCESA. “They’re interested in other
things, not the city or municipal government.”105 Communities urban and
rural alike asserted that councilmen were poor quality and did not repre-
sent them or their aspirations. Sucrenses had a higher opinion of their
mayor, though opinion was divided between city and countryside. Urban
dwellers appeared to be reasonably content with their local executive, while
rural villagers reported that municipal resources never arrived; they judged
their condition to be as bad as before decentralization or worse, to the point
where some wanted to secede from the district.106 While the mayor pursued
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important investment projects in the city, he was criticized for offering the
villages “little patches that distract them but don’t satisfy their needs.”107
The weakness of civil society meant that most rural (and many urban)
communities did not have the capacity to draw up project plans or lobby
government to answer their most pressing needs. This, along with Sucre’s
political vacuum, meant that the mayor faced few binding external incen-
tives and hence responded to public needs largely on account of his own
preferences.
Instead of seeking to overcome the urban/rural divide, government in-
stitutionalized it by establishing an independent oversight committee for
each. While this might at ‹rst appear to be a reasonable response to hetero-
geneity, its effect in practice was to weaken civil society still further before
institutions of government that had not, after all, themselves been divided.
In any event, both OCs were poor. The urban consensus held that its OC
was ineffective, repeatedly failing to provide project oversight, with only its
vice president complying with his duties. The performance of the rural OC
was more variable, suffering from its own weakness and the hostility of
some midlevel municipal authorities; the few good reports it merited from
village leaders stood out among a mass of negative opinion. Thus a surpris-
ingly sophisticated and effective administrative apparatus coexisted along-
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side an ineffective municipal council, a weakly accountable mayor, and a di-
vided OC. It is not surprising that public investment responded only
tepidly to popular demand, and that satisfaction with local government was
only lukewarm. Sucre’s investment planning system was symptomatic of its
local government: the municipality employed a well-designed, comprehen-
sive, iterative planning procedure that carefully incorporated participation
throughout. But it also took advantage of its in›uence and technical com-
petence to distort some communities’ requests arbitrarily. Unusually for
Bolivia, Sucre’s municipal government was the largest local actor. It had
signi‹cant power over civil society, not the other way around, and this
showed in the way the district was governed.
Porongo
Small, rural, and poor, Porongo was in some ways similar to Baures, with an
economy dominated by small family farms, no industry, and no powerful
interests in residence. But its population was much more mixed by years of
migration, to the point where most porongueños were recently arrived
Quechua speakers who did not share the local diet, religion, or other tradi-
tions. Nonetheless con›ict was rare among these diverse groups, who
shared very similar economic interests. What might have been a quiet, con-
sensual public life among Porongo’s residents was instead riven and dis-
torted by its residentes, a powerful and relatively wealthy group of ex-
porongueños who lived in the industrial economy of nearby Santa Cruz and
ran the municipality from their urban enclave. They used their money and
status to dominate local politics, which accordingly turned on their partic-
ular concerns. By and large these were the children of the leading lights of
the town, who left to study and work in Santa Cruz. They assuaged feelings
of rootlessness or disorientation in the city by conjecturing a happy, bucolic
past consisting largely of games and traditional crafts set in a rural idyll.
This they then sought to recreate and impose on the actual residents of
Porongo. Hence the Civic Committee for Women, composed of residentes,
hoped soon to offer local women courses in “dress- making, pastry-making,
knitting and traditional artisanery,” its president reported.108 “There’s no
inventory of the town’s cultural patrimony,” she added worriedly, explain-
ing her proposal for a museum of local culture. In effect, the residentes
sought to turn a dynamic community in the midst of signi‹cant economic
and demographic change into a museum of their imagined past, a sort of
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zoo ‹lled with the traditions and symbols they themselves had left behind.
Not surprisingly, this was resisted by a population that never knew such a
past and who did not want it as their future. The real interests and problems
of rural Porongo were unable to penetrate this evocative haze, and in this
way the residentes’ ‹xation with the town’s plaza central displaced the agri-
cultural priorities of a rural economy.
The urban elite was able to get away with this because of the fragmented
nature of Porongo’s civil society and because they completely dominated its
politics. The district’s many and diverse migrant groups distrusted each
other and, often too weak to organize among themselves, were unable to es-
tablish broad civic associations that spanned the district’s villages and eth-
nicities. Thus splintered, civil society could neither effectively represent
grassroots demand to local government nor mobilize popular support
against the ruling elite. Meanwhile local politics—completely uncompeti-
tive—offered no recourse. Local parties were all colonized by residentes, and
all allied together in the municipal council. With no political opposition,
party dynamics in Porongo consisted of a sharing-out of power among the
residentes, something facilitated by high voter absenteeism in the country-
side. In terms of the model, the cash market for in›uence between parties
and private interests was very strong and in turn undermined the market
for votes and policies; the entire political system, in effect, represented a sin-
gle narrow interest group. At the same time, the logic of social representa-
tion was interrupted by civil society’s institutional weakness. It is thus not
surprising that local government in Porongo was neither representative of
nor responsive to the people.
Thus the municipal councilmen, of whom four out of ‹ve lived in Santa
Cruz, were widely judged untransparent, oblivious to local needs, and pri-
marily concerned with their own or their parties’ interests.109 They held
more council sessions in Santa Cruz than Porongo and were accused by
many of conspiring to exclude porongueños—including the OC—from mu-
nicipal business by keeping the times and places of their meetings secret. The
mayor, on the other hand, was an attractive and expansive former soccer
player from Santa Cruz whose populist instincts took him deep into the
countryside regularly. Public opinion credited him with good intentions but
criticized his of‹cers as poor and unaccountable, and reproached his ad-
ministration more generally for operating in a desultory, capricious manner.
Much of this was blamed on politicians’ residence in the city, which compli-
cated coordination with of‹cials in town and helped obscure responsibility.
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But it is notable that neither was subject to external political or economic
constraints that might otherwise have modi‹ed their behavior. Last, respon-
dents agreed that the oversight committee was lucky to have a president who
was honest and hardworking. But the mayor and municipal council worked
equally hard to obstruct him and exclude the OC from of‹cial decision mak-
ing, denying him the of‹ce to which he was entitled and refusing to provide
transport. Given no resources, and civic organizations too weak to either
support him or oppose the municipality actively, the ability of this modest
farmer to hold government to account was minimal. In the words of one
community leader, “They’ve left him all alone.”110 As a result, and despite a
healthy moral authority, the OC in Porongo was weak.
With a weak OC, a terminally unresponsive municipal council, and a
mayor with more will than ability to satisfy voters, it is surprising not that
the quality of government was mediocre, but rather that it was not worse.
This can largely be attributed to the mayor’s desire for popularity, which led
him to make investments that—community leaders agreed—satis‹ed some
of their needs and led to modest improvements in public services. Such is
the value of leadership in a governing system that otherwise would, in all
likelihood, have performed even worse.
Porongo’s bridge project exempli‹ed the system out of which it came.
This, the star investment in the municipal portfolio, was set to connect an
uninhabited point 15 kilometers east of the town with the exclusive neigh-
borhood of Equipetrol in Santa Cruz. But local farmers sold their produce
in a different part of the city, for which this bridge was not useful. And with
no extant road connecting the town to the bridge site, it was not dif‹cult to
judge the bridge either a prestige project or a piece of land speculation, de-
signed to urbanize the near bank of the river and multiply property prices.
In either case, those who stood to bene‹t were the residentes and not
Porongo’s rural population.
Atocha
Atocha sits alone on the third rung of municipal quality, with an economy
diversi‹ed to the point of disjointedness. Local economic actors were almost
entirely small-scale and divided cleanly between cooperative mining and
subsistence family farms, with little to connect the two. As the town’s econ-
omy was built around mining services and trade in minerals, urban interests
were more receptive to miners’ demands than those of rural farmers. This
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bias was compounded by high electoral absenteeism in the countryside,
which gave villagers little voice inside local government. The political system
as a whole was uncompetitive, with a three-party governing coalition hold-
ing three-quarters of the vote and no active opposition. It was also primarily
an urban phenomenon, focused on control of the apparatus of local govern-
ment, and thus intrinsically sterile. Real political interaction, in the sense of
genuinely opposed interests competing over resources, occurred sporadi-
cally outside formal politics, in Atocha’s streets and plazas, when the miners
mobilized and marched on city hall in defense of their interests. Civil society
was also clearly divided in Atocha, between highly organized immigrant
miners with a large capacity for mobilization, poor and badly organized na-
tive farmers in the countryside, and the merchants and employees in town
who were relatively well-off and well-placed to lobby local government.
The irony of Atochan politics was that the two groups with signi‹cant
power to in›uence policy and capture resources—miners and merchants—
were precisely the groups most dependent on the highly cyclical mining in-
dustry and hence the most willing to abandon the district when the indus-
try slumped. Recent history had illustrated this dramatically, with Atocha’s
mines abandoned wholesale in the late 1980s, followed by an upswing a
decade later that more than doubled the district’s population. Hence those
who were most adept at securing public investment were also those with the
least incentive to invest in their communities themselves. Meanwhile those
who combined the worst level of public services with the clearest long-term
interest in the prosperity of their communities—Atocha’s peasant farm-
ers—suffered the weakest ability to mobilize to press local government with
their needs. With sterile politics and a civil society that was divided and in-
coherent, it is not surprising that Atocha’s government performed poorly.
Local public opinion re›ected this. In terms of the model, the cash market
for policies and in›uence operated normally, while the primary political
market for votes was in large part strangled by electoral absenteeism and an
uncompetitive party system. The divided and institutionally crippled na-
ture of civil society completed a governance system that was unbalanced
and inequitable. Hence public resources and attention in Atocha were
skewed toward areas where they were least needed (the town) and least sus-
tainable over time (the mines), while ignoring those areas (rural villages)
where need was greatest and investments most likely to prove sustainable.
The municipality went so far as to allocate resources to miners from adja-
cent districts before its own villagers.
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The failure of Atochan politics was seen most clearly in its municipal
council. The least impressive of Atocha’s institutions of local government, it
was largely inactive and headed by an illiterate president. Councilmen
seemed rarely to leave the town, and a strong public consensus held that they
responded primarily to their parties “due to their own ignorance.”111 With
little incentive to tend to villagers’ needs, the council focused on urban issues
and the simplistic politics of municipal patronage. In the words of the OC
president, “Initiatives aren’t followed up from year to year. There’s little co-
ordination among parties and between governing periods. This is bad for
projects and for municipal work.”112 The mayor, on the other hand, was re-
garded as well-meaning and honest, but he lacked administrative ability and
leadership. Although he made special efforts to reach out to rural villages,
the combination of his own background and the highly partial political en-
vironment in which he operated led him also to favor the town and miners.
In institutional terms, the oversight committee stood between the
mayor and municipal council, divided like the society it represented. Of its
six members, three worked conscientiously to represent civic opinion in
public debate, but two members were inactive, and a third—the vice presi-
dent—had escaped to Potosí. A lack of resources and the presence of only
one member, the secretary, in the town further hampered the OC’s effec-
tiveness. Nevertheless, community leaders agreed that the OC was effective
in overseeing and modifying government policy, especially in the town and
main mining centers. But transport to farming villages was more dif‹cult,
and there its effect was scarcely felt. Thus government in Atocha consisted
of a reasonably competent mayor working with an ignorant and ineffective
municipal council, and an oversight committee that was fairly capable but
faced severe institutional limitations. The result was mediocre policy-mak-
ing that skewed investment toward those with the loudest political voice
and ignored those with greatest need. Like Porongo, this case highlights the
importance of leadership: with a compromised system of local governance
and weak public institutions, Atocha was pregnant with the possibility of
even worse government. That it was merely mediocre is testament in large
part to the mayor’s goodwill and the OC president’s leadership.
Desaguadero
Desaguadero heads the trio of worst performers in our group. A rich bor-
der town with its own abundant revenues, its government was lucrative to
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control, and local businessmen vied to run it. But despite a large and valu-
able trade with neighboring Peru, Desaguadero’s main economic inter-
ests—transport ‹rms and related businesses that serviced cross-border
trade—were small and medium sized, with no dominant actors. The fact
that the most important businesses were mobile implied that these inter-
ests, by and large, were not entrenched, and hence more sensitive to the
costs of political involvement than elsewhere. Socially Desaguadero was re-
ally two municipalities, with two economies and two civil societies quite
disconnected. Rural Desaguadero, though well-organized at the village
level, was too poor to mobilize itself at the district level and hence remained
splintered and weak in the face of urban society. The town’s GROs, by con-
trast, were better-‹nanced and—living on the municipality’s doorstep—
found it much easier to catch government’s attention. They were able to
dominate civic discourse to the exclusion of rural concerns and interests
but were themselves divided between two organizational forms, which
sapped their institutional strength. Last, politics, in the sense of ideology or
national party dynamics, barely mattered in Desaguadero. Local politics
was about occupying power, and although a formal opposition existed, pol-
itics was not competitive. Rather it was an accommodative pursuit free of
substantive political discourse, where the sharing-out of spoils was punctu-
ated by periodic elections in which a changing business elite sought to gain
control of the instruments of power. With no political accountability, lim-
ited social oversight from urban areas, and none from the countryside, lo-
cal government was free to be manipulated at will by the interest groups
that captured it, responding grudgingly to urban demands and ignoring
those of the villages. Local governance was worse in rural areas than in
town, and overall quality was poor. In terms of the model, the cash market
for policy in›uence was healthy and dominated the political market for
votes, itself undermined by an uncompetitive party system. Meanwhile civil
society, twice divided, was too ill-informed and too weak to hold politicians
to account. It is thus not surprising that disappointment with local govern-
ment was rife at the grassroots level.
The municipal council exempli‹ed local government’s failings. A broad
consensus held that it was thoroughly politicized, attuned to the needs of
the parties and insensitive to its voters. “It’s all politics,” said the leaders of
Titijumi and Huancollo, describing the council’s work.113 Tellingly, not
even townspeople could explain how it functioned, though some evidence
suggested the council was cowed and manipulated by the mayor. The mayor
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himself and his staff received bad reviews from his constituents, though a
number attributed this to his short time in of‹ce. Subject to little social or
political oversight, he could do as he pleased, as the town’s 70 percent share
of the investment budget—twice its share of population—indicated. But so
far he had done little. Last, the oversight committee re›ected the lay of the
district. Its presidency alternated between the two urban GROs, never going
to any rural member, and hence the OC—like the municipal council—re-
mained in the grip of the town. This, however, was less signi‹cant than it
might have been, as the OC was convincingly ineffective. Some residents ac-
cused them of ignoring their duties, and others of taking bribes to do so.
When I arranged to interview its president he did not arrive—I later found
him with his (OC) of‹cers on a street corner, literally falling down drunk.114
The vice president, to whom I did speak, professed ignorance about one of
the town’s largest investment projects. “I demand to know which are our
most important objectives,” he thundered at me, “as soon as possible!”115
With the institutions responsible for oversight and accountability either
politicized or suborned or both, leaving the municipal executive free of ex-
ternal discipline, local government was no better than mediocre and possi-
bly corrupt, and largely ignored its residents’ needs.
Guayaramerín
Guayaramerín was a complex combination of extremes of wealth and
power in a context of high social diversity, which produced a very particu-
lar political dynamic. The city had been transformed by the migratory
boom of the postwar period, which multiplied its size and ‹lled it with
people and cultures from throughout Bolivia. With different languages and
traditions, Guayaramerín’s many ethnicities jostled each other in the streets
and markets of the city but found it dif‹cult to trust each other or even, in
some cases, to communicate. This impeded cooperation at the neighbor-
hood level, and civic organizations were slow to form. When they ‹nally
did, it was under the tutelage of local government. This effectively allowed
Guayaramerín’s political parties to intervene in community formation for
the sake of partisan advantage. Civil society was thus party-politicized,
making GRO leaders beholden to political masters and neutralizing com-
munity groups as an independent source of authority in the district. In Put-
nam’s terms, the horizontal linkages of civic organizations were instigated
by political parties for explicitly partisan ends, rendering them unable to
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conduct effective oversight of politicians, and unlikely to promote their
constituents’ interests in the political process. Politics, meanwhile, was the
preserve of local power brokers, de‹ned by the agreements they reached,
and not the domain of collective action or action on behalf of the collectiv-
ity. There was little ideology and little adherence to national strategies; this
was not a politics of ideas but rather of power and of in›uence. In part no
doubt because society was fractured, the people of Guayaramerín had a
weak tradition of political participation. The elitist conduct of policy
sapped the legitimacy of politics and people’s belief in the possibility of
voice. Electoral absenteeism was high. Like Atocha, this in turn facilitated
the efforts of a business and political elite to keep themselves in power
through a variety of means.
But the de‹ning feature of Guayaramerín was its economy—rich, di-
verse, and thoroughly dominated by a small coterie of powerful business-
men who also ran the city’s important public and private institutions.
Hence the president of the municipal council was also head of the tele-
phone cooperative, the mayor was a prominent timber merchant, and the
head of the local ADN owned two of the district’s three television stations,
along with several agribusiness and transport concerns. Guayaramerín was
thus run by a probusiness, of-the-business alliance primarily interested in
the growth of the local economy, as well as in distributing municipal busi-
ness among themselves. They admitted little public debate before key mu-
nicipal decisions and kept of‹cial accounts, investment plans (including the
OAP), and other records very much out of the public eye. Once in power
they left political divisions aside and behaved as a clan, providing no re-
straint on each other’s actions and ignoring each other’s transgressions.
They adhered to a trickle-down philosophy and were more interested in ac-
cumulation than in actively oppressing any group in particular. But because
their cause was pro-growth and their interests encompassed essentially the
entire local economy, private accumulation had historically led to public
accumulation too.
This business elite proved adept at developing Guayaramerín during the
decades when it was a forgotten provincial town with few public resources
because it was able to marshal private resources for the collective good
when the question at hand was also a business priority. Thus electricity and
telephone service were both brought to the city through cooperatives led by
prominent local businessmen, and much street-paving and the decoration
of the central plaza were made possible through private contributions. But
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this model of “governance,” which relied on informal contacts and private
agreements, proved de‹cient at running a more complex municipal gov-
ernment that presided over a large rural hinterland. The advent of decen-
tralization brought the district signi‹cant public resources, the administra-
tion of which demanded transparency and extensive consultation. And the
business elite was not good at this. In terms of the model, the primary mar-
ket for votes and policies was weak on account of an elite-dominated, un-
competitive party system. The cash market for policies and in›uence, on
the other hand, was very strong indeed. And the logic of social representa-
tion was comprehensively undermined by the political capture of commu-
nity organizations. Thus Guayaramerín’s local governance system was se-
verely unbalanced, and it is no surprise that the municipality proved biased
toward the city and insensitive to local needs.
Guayaramerín’s municipal council was in some ways the institutional-
ization of its ruling elite, populated as it was by prominent locals. But what-
ever their abilities as businessmen, as councilmen they rated very poorly.
“The priest,” said one observer, referring to the MBL councilman, “is a
demagogue. . . . The rest of the council is useless.”116 Popular opinion held
that they responded to their own interests and to those of their parties, and
even the council president conceded that their parties told them what to
do.117 The leader of the 1o de Mayo community described the effects of such
politicization: “When we go to see them [councilmen] in Guayaramerín to
request something or discuss some concern, they ask us what party we be-
long to. If we answer their own party, then we’re attended very well.”118 The
mayor appeared to be somewhat more effective and less aggressively politi-
cal, although he bene‹ted from the comparison with a detested predeces-
sor. The popular consensus held that he had brought about some improve-
ments in the city but had had little or no effect in the countryside. A
number of observers accused him of promoting conspicuous infrastructure
projects while ignoring the more important needs of the populace.119
“There are big problems here, and the municipality is dedicated to small
things,” said the parish priest.120 Many others reproached him for refusing
to meet with GRO representatives and obstructing participation gener-
ally.121 To the extent that the mayor cultivated an image of effectiveness, this
was largely a facade, a shield behind which the ruling elite could strike the
serious deals implicit in running a large municipality.
Last, Guayaramerín’s oversight committee was different in its overt
politicization from those of our six other municipalities. Political parties
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largely determined its composition through their manipulation of GROs,
OC candidates ran political-style campaigns, and its president promptly
identi‹ed himself as an ADN man. But most important of all, city hall held
the power to change the OC leadership if it chose, and had wielded it in the
past.122 Thus compromised by the parties, the OC was neutralized as an in-
dependent authority and had little say in of‹cial decisions. With a politi-
cized and unresponsive municipal council, a posturing mayor who ob-
structed popular participation, and an oversight committee in‹ltrated and
neutralized by political parties, popular dissatisfaction with local govern-
ment was virtually assured, and was forthcoming. But city hall seemed
oblivious to such considerations. The mayor shifted municipal alliances
with ease after the ADN took power in La Paz, and the business of govern-
ing continued undisrupted.
Sipe Sipe
Our last municipality, Sipe Sipe, was different from the other worst-per-
forming districts in several important ways. Unlike Desaguadero and Gua-
yaramerín, it had a homogeneous agricultural economy in which the town
provided markets and agricultural services for farmers in the villages. And
with no haciendas remaining after 1953, the district lacked dominant—or
even large—economic actors. But common economic interests did not lead
to a government responsive to people’s needs, and this was in part the fault
of politics. Sipe Sipe’s party system was uncompetitive, af›icted by dema-
goguery and an insider dynamic that allowed the mayor, when forced to re-
sign under a cloud of suspicion, to swap jobs with the president of the mu-
nicipal council and continue in government. Fairly low electoral
participation rates facilitated such manipulations by the political elite to re-
main in power. In this way the political system was rendered unresponsive
to popular concerns, and real, substantive political competition occurred
instead outside formal politics, spearheaded by GROs and the oversight
committee.
Sipe Sipe’s civil society was well suited to this role, with strong institu-
tional characteristics arising from a high degree of ethnic and cultural ho-
mogeneity that allowed it to mobilize around common goals effectively. Its
civic associations were well-established, some from before the Spanish
Conquest and others from the 1950s, with strong traditions of self-govern-
ment and popular mobilization. But a local government both politicized
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and involuted failed to exploit its potential, and community groups had lit-
tle participation in the planning or execution of municipal projects. This
helps to explain popular discontent with Sipe Sipe’s government, criticized
throughout the district as unresponsive to local needs. It also explains why
civil society was plotting to seize the reins of power and overthrow the
mayor. Old, organized, and largely excluded from the local governance sys-
tem, civic organizations had both the means to ‹ght local authorities and
the will to do so. In terms of the model, the secondary market for policies
and in›uence, given feeble economic actors, operated weakly, while the
market for votes and policies was disrupted by an untransparent, anticom-
petitive party system. And the logic of social representation, which should
have ›ourished in a context of social coherence, was arti‹cially disrupted by
authorities who connived to sti›e it.
The municipal council exempli‹ed many of the ›aws of government in
Sipe Sipe. A highly politicized body, it was a forum for political intrigue and
widely believed to be corrupt. Popular consensus held that councilmen
obeyed ‹rst their own pockets and then their parties, before considering the
needs of the voters. The mayor and municipal executive displayed similar
characteristics, dictating which investment projects a number of communi-
ties received and excluding popular participation from the government
process generally. “The municipality thinks the AOP is a sacred document,”
reported the leaders of Mallco Rancho.123 Popular consensus held that gov-
ernment and public services had improved little or not at all since decen-
tralization “because politicians cheat us [and] the municipality spends
money according to its own convenience.”124 Last, the oversight committee
failed to oversee municipal business adequately on account of its own igno-
rance and inactivity. When asked about a major water project almost on his
doorstep, the OC president proved utterly uninformed. GRO leaders agreed
that the OC did little to ful‹ll its of‹cial duties, accusing its leader of par-
tiality to the mayor. With a mayor and municipal council that were politi-
cized, unresponsive, and corrupt, and an oversight committee ignorant and
complicit with the authorities it was bound to oversee, local government
did not perform well. And the people of Sipe Sipe, naturally, were discon-
tented. But the striking fact about the system of local governance in Sipe
Sipe was the ability and willingness of its civic organizations to confront the
problem directly. The decentralization law strengthened their hand by
granting them control of the OC, which in turn gave them the means to
challenge the mayor and a chance to overthrow him.
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Summary and Comparisons
Table 12 summarizes the main factors used in the above analysis. It does this
by mapping the information in tables 9, 10, and 11 into three columns, which
correspond to the following concepts: (1) openness and competitiveness in
the local economy (vs. hegemony or dominance by a few ‹rms/actors); (2)
civil society’s institutional coherence and ability; and (3) an open, competi-
tive political system marked by political entrepreneurship and policy inno-
vation. As is argued in the third section and demonstrated in the fourth
above, these variables are key to explaining the quality of a district’s govern-
ing institutions, and hence the quality of governance received. Mapping is
done by assigning each municipality a value between one and ‹ve, where
one is lowest (worst) and ‹ve is highest (best). While the value for each dis-
trict is primarily based on that of the relevant column in tables 9–11, it also
attempts to summarize the information in each table more generally. The
schematization implicit in such notional values is a necessary compromise
in order to present a large and diverse amount of information succinctly.
Together, these economic, social, and political factors determine the
fourth column, the overall responsiveness and accountability of the local
governance system. In simple terms, this captures the extent to which citi-
zens are able to make local government do things for them, where govern-
ment is construed to include the mayor, municipal council, and oversight
TABLE 12. The Local Governance System Summarized
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open and Civil Responsiveness and
Competitive  Society  Competitive Accountability of
Rank Municipality Economy ICAa Politics Governance System
1 Charagua 4 5 5 5
Baures 4 5 5 5
2 Porongo 2 2 1 2
Sucre 3 3 3 3
3 Atocha 4 2 2 2
4 Desaguadero 4 2 2 1
Guayaramerín 1 1 1 1
Sipe Sipe 5 4 2 3
Viacha 1 2 1 1
Source: Author’s interviews, observation, and other fieldwork.
Note: Columns 1, 2, and 3 summarize the information in tables 9, 10, and 11. Values: 1 = lowest, worst; 5 =
highest, best. Viacha and Charagua added for purposes of comparison.
aInstitutional coherence and accountability.
+ + =>
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committee. The column summarizes citizen’s responses to a variety of
questions put to them in my extended interviews. As argued in the previous
section, the responsiveness of a district’s governing institutions maps di-
rectly into people’s perceptions of government quality, as given by their sat-
isfaction with the public services and policy they receive. The ranking of
municipalities in table 12 demonstrates this—rank is according to popular
perceptions and closely tracks the values of column four. A comparison
with table 8 provides further corroboration.
The obvious exception to this analysis is Sipe Sipe, where a mediocre
level of government responsiveness and accountability is associated with
performance that is signi‹cantly worse. In other words, the model predicts
a higher quality of government than respondents reported. This is because
the district possessed two of the three conditions necessary for good local
government: a competitive economy and a high level of social coherence;
but the third—a competitive local politics—was actively stymied by machi-
nations of the mayor and municipal council. But Sipe Sipe’s civil society,
mobilized around a common goal, was taking the necessary steps to over-
turn the mayor. This implies that the local governance system, if temporar-
ily diverted by the strategies of its of‹cials, was in the longer term respon-
sive to the demands of the people. Hence Sipe Sipe’s low rank must be
judged a transitory phenomenon—the district was likely to perform closer
to the model’s prediction soon.
A less obvious exception is Porongo, ranked by its respondents in the
second tier of districts but with economic, social, and political scores that
are signi‹cantly worse. Its combination of economic dominance by a small
group of friends, a fractured civil society lacking trust, and an almost com-
ically uncompetitive political regime should have secured it a place at the
bottom of the table. That it did not is largely attributable to the populist in-
stincts of its mayor. This illustrates the difference leadership can make, and
the power of personality in a municipal system as systematically under-
mined as Porongo’s. But it is instructive to remember the lesson of chapter
6: leadership is not entirely exogenous. The comparison with Sipe Sipe per-
mits further re‹nement—leadership is likely to be exogenous only in the
short term, but determined endogenously by municipal characteristics in
the longer term. Unscrupulous political agents will tend to operate in mu-
nicipalities where government oversight and accountability are crippled by
economic monopoly, distorted political competition, or deep-set social an-
tagonisms. Whereas in Sipe Sipe a responsive political system prepared to
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eject bad politicians who sought to pervert it, Porongo’s dormant civil soci-
ety if anything attracted them. Over time the quality of government in
Porongo was likely to fall more easily than rise, dependent as it was on the
quality of its leadership. Hence both cases are exceptions that prove the
rule, con‹rming the value of the model.
Another telling comparison is between the Atochan communities of
Chorolque and Villa Solano, or for that matter any of a number of un-
formed communities in Porongo and elsewhere. In the former, a preexist-
ing social unit organized around a very strong economic incentive—the
miners’ cooperative—took on GRO responsibilities quickly and effectively,
and was highly involved in project selection, supervision, and execution.
Civil society in Villa Solano, meanwhile, was still asleep, relatively unorga-
nized, and uninvolved in its own governance. This highlights the role of so-
cial organization per se, as distinct from demographic characteristics. It im-
plies that a community can take advantage of existing social organizations
established for different purposes to mobilize collective efforts in the inter-
ests of local government. The fact that the people of Chorolque were mi-
grants from across the altiplano, and no community had operated there
only a few years earlier, whereas Villa Solano was stable and homogeneous,
underscores the point. But Chorolque also illustrates how the operational
characteristics of the underlying organization can spill over into local gov-
ernance, not always with salutary effects. In this case, the miners’ strong tra-
dition of political activism led them to take FIS of‹cials hostage in order to
demand further investments. The long-term effects of this action on local
investment were unlikely to be positive.
Guayaramerín is notable as the only case where political competition
preceded the organization of civil society. Politicians’ success in colonizing
community organizations there suggests that civic institutions must pre-
cede political parties if they are to act as checks and balances on their exer-
cise of power. The logic of social organization must be different from the
narrow logic of factionalism, patronage, and electioneering. Where parties
literally precede civil society, they place themselves in a prime position to
capture social groups as they are formed, and to manipulate them for par-
tisan—and not civic—ends. The comparison of Guayaramerín, where citi-
zens made no attempt to change municipal policy, with Sipe Sipe, where
they organized to overthrow the mayor, makes this clear.
With respect to the oversight committee, the comparison between Bau-
res and Sipe Sipe is similar to that between Charagua and Viacha, and hence
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supports the interpretation in chapter 6: where the mayor and municipal
council represent their voters and respond effectively to popular demand,
the function of the oversight committee is greatly diminished. It only be-
comes a binding constraint when one or both institutions malfunction.
And if the OC itself is neutralized as a decision-making body, civil society
must rely on its own devices. But as the experiences of both Viacha and Sipe
Sipe vividly demonstrate, when society is coherent and well-organized it is
more than capable of defending its interests.
The ‹nal, small but compelling observation concerns Baures and its
separation from the municipality of Magdalena two years into the decen-
tralization process. While it was subordinate to Magdalena, Baures was
comprehensively ignored by town hall. There was no local governance sys-
tem in operation, as the subdistrict received few resources, and few GROs
were organized. But after separation, local government ›ourished in Bau-
res. Neighborhood and community groups sprang up to participate in pol-
icy decisions, and public resources were invested equitably according to
communities’ greatest needs. Public services improved considerably, and
the people applauded their local government. This transition from stasis to
governance is an illustration of the potential of decentralization. The exem-
plary experience of such a tiny population suggests that decentralization in
Bolivia can be taken further, driving democracy even deeper into the roots
of society.
Conclusions: Refining the Model
As ‹ne-tuned above, the model of the local governance system can explain
the quality of government in all nine municipalities, including Viacha and
Charagua as well as the two outliers. More important, it is suf‹ciently sen-
sitive to distinguish between cases that alternative theories would expect to
be similar, but that in fact show very different levels of performance. A
common claim, for example, is that performance is a positive function of
municipal size or wealth, as smaller/poorer municipalities lack the human
and ‹nancial resources to confront the problems of government. But such
a theory can not explain the position of Guayaramerín, one of the largest
and wealthiest districts, at the bottom of the list, nor that of tiny Baures at
the top. Another argument, found frequently in the political science litera-
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ture, is that the presence of dominant interests leads to interest-group cap-
ture and hence unresponsive government. But this only explains perfor-
mance in one of our worst-performing group—Guayaramerín—and not
the other two. Last, my own econometric results imply that small, rural mu-
nicipalities are more sensitive to local needs than their larger, urban
cousins. But the two smallest districts in our group—Baures and De-
saguadero—sit at opposite extremes, while the largest and most urban—
Sucre—lies near the top. The model developed above can explain all of
these apparent contradictions. It can also explain why the underlying qual-
ity of governance in Sipe Sipe was better than it appeared, and why govern-
ment could be expected to improve suddenly there.
The greater amount of information available from adding seven cases to
our original two permits a rough sort of “sensitivity analysis” of the differ-
ent elements of the model in order to gauge their relative importance. Con-
sider the positions of Baures and Sipe Sipe in table 12. This suggests that all
three determinants must rate highly in order for government to perform
well. Having two good factors is not enough, nor indeed is one. But closer
examination reveals that economic structure is least well correlated with
the fourth column. Politics and civil society track overall responsiveness
and accountability better, suggesting that they jointly determine govern-
ment quality. But at this point it is instructive to ask, Which of these factors
is exogenous and which is endogenous? It is easy to see that the local econ-
omy is essentially given. It is part of the superstructure within which poli-
tics and civic organizations operate, and—short of revolution or expropri-
ation—changes too slowly to be determined in any useful sense by the other
factors in the model. The institutional capacity of civil society is also exoge-
nous. Although it will develop and change over time, internalizing the in-
centives generated by its environment more rapidly than economic struc-
ture can, it is ultimately dependent on characteristics such as culture,
language, encompassing interest, and trust—characteristics that should re-
main exogenous in a political economy model of government.
A competitive political system, on the other hand, is different—depen-
dent as it is upon the constellation of economic and other interests at the
local level, as well as on political participation by citizens and turnout at
elections. According to their strength and their behavior, a district’s private
interests can monopolize its politics or contribute to openness and compe-
tition, and voters can make their demands known and hold politicians to
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account, or not, by the extent to which they vote and participate in policy
discussions. Thus assuming a legal and institutional framework that guar-
antees a secret ballot, fair vote count, and free entry of political agents—es-
sential assumptions for any democratic system—competitive politics is de-
termined endogenously. Poor or corrupt leaders can emerge spontaneously,
of course, but over time the character not only of political leadership but of
the entire political system will be given by the interactions of civil society
and economic structure. This is born out by the preceding analysis, which
shows this process in action in our seven municipalities. Figure 10 presents
these relationships graphically and shows how they relate to the previous
model of local governance. In essence this model is a restatement of the pre-
vious one. But whereas the ‹rst model is structural, representing the main
actors involved in the local government process, this one is dynamic, focus-
ing on the interactions between these actors and the chain of causality that
leads to government responsiveness and accountability.
Last a question: what sorts of interventions can improve the quality of
local government? Very generally, and assuming that legal guarantees of
free and fair voting are in place, ‹gure 10 suggests that civil society should
be the key object of such policies. If economic structure is exogenous and
changes slowly, then efforts to increase the responsiveness and accountabil-
ity of government institutions can usefully focus on strengthening civic or-
ganizations, increasing their participation in the policy debate and their
in›uence on the local political system. Such efforts should take account of
how civic groups enter the local governing process and which are the key
inputs they provide, as discussed above. Principal among these is continu-
ous feedback on grassroots needs and the effectiveness of government ac-
tion. This can serve to complement a voting mechanism that is intermittent
and ungraduated, and thus unsuited for prompting incremental policy
changes. In so doing, it can help to counterbalance the in›uence of private
interests on politicians, which tends to be both continuous and compelling,
and to lead in the long term to patronage and insularity in the local politi-
cal system. But national authorities and development practitioners alike
should be very wary when planning such strengthening activities. The fun-
damental point of decentralization is that decisions are made locally, ac-
cording to local priorities. Outsiders must take care not to disrupt this
process. Hence their policy interventions must be discrete and highly tar-
geted, and focused above all on enhancing the insertion of civil society into
the local governance system.
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Fig. 10. Two models of local government
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Notes to Bonus Web Chapter
1. This index represents the gap between a municipality’s basic needs and avail-
able public services, and is calculated from census data. A value of one represents
maximum deprivation.
2. The main articles of the LPP are summarized in chapter 1.
3. From nothing to Bs. 2.7 million.
4. See ‹gures 1–7 for sectoral breakdowns. Sources: municipal interviews and
Ministry of Finance database.
5. Silvio Rojas Aguilera, mayor, interview, Porongo, 7 April 1997.
6. Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of all seven municipali-
ties. See interview list for details.
7. Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of Desaguadero, Gua-
yaramerín, and Sucre.
8. Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of Atocha, Baures,
Porongo, and Sipe Sipe.
9. Ibid.
10. Desaguadero, Guayaramerín, and Sucre, interviews.
11. Raimundo Candia, municipal general secretary (i.e., chief of‹cer), interview,
Sucre, 15 April 1997.
12. Rosendo Mamani Quispe, mayor, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997.
13. I de‹ne large as in the upper quintile of municipalities by population.
14. All respondents were asked to rate public investment projects and the quality
of local public services on the following scale: Very Bad—Bad—Regular—Good—
Very Good.
15. Oscar Durán, neighborhood council president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997.
16. Juan Jahnsen, Jasiakiri community leader, interview, El Cairo, 3 May 1997.
17. Hugo Melgar Barbery and Erland Ayllón Parada, municipal council president
(MIR) and member (independent, ex-MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May 1997.
18. Claudio Torres, community leader, interview, Chuqui-Chuquí, 18 April 1997.
19. Benedicto Bonilla Rojas, oversight committee president, interview, Porongo,
7 April 1997.
20. When referring to village-level testimony I often use the construction “Vil-
lage X said” to mean “the leaders of Village X said,” in the interest of parsimony;
notes also receive this treatment in the interest of accuracy.
21. Chuqui-Chuquí, interview.
22. Raúl Mamani Villca, oversight committee president, interview, Siete Suyos,
22 April 1997. The project in question is a cameloid (i.e., llamas, alpacas, and
vicuñas) development project.
23. Fr. José Dessart, parish priest, interview, Atocha, 25 April 1997.
24. Alberto Albert, municipal technical adviser and ex-municipal council presi-
dent, interview, Guayaramerín, 20 October 1997.
25. Eduardo Ala, Celso Cuba, and Andrés Cuba, community leader, spokesman,
and of‹cer, interview, Siquisiquía, 29 May 1997.
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26. Guillermo Saavedra Crespo, César Árnez Mondragón, Eduardo Céspedes,
and Fernando Montán Árnez, community president, vice president, of‹cer, and
oversight committee vice president, interview, Mallco Rancho, 28 May 1997.
27. Gabriel Sosa Salvatierra, hospital director, interview, Guayaramerín, 22 Oc-
tober 1997.
28. Demetrio Orellana, community leader, interview, Parotani, 27 May 1997.
29. Hugo Ayllón Parada, Cattlemen’s Association president, interview, Baures, 2
May 1997.
30. Grover Martínez Franco, mayor, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. I adhere to lo-
cal de‹nitions, where large is more than 1,000 head of cattle, medium is 300 to 600,
and small is less than 300.
31. El Cairo, interview. See chapter 3, box 1, The Slavery of Captive Communities,
for a description of the general phenomenon.
32. H. Ayllón, interview.
33. Alfredo Bravo Mujica and Mario Cerda Escalante, municipal councilmen
(MNR and ADN respectively), interview, Desaguadero, 24 March 1997.
34. Alfredo Yáñez and Juan Carlos Sobut, directors of the Chamber of Com-
merce, interview, Sucre, 16 April 1997. Sucre is located 1,500 meters lower than the
mining center of Potosí and has a dry, mild climate.
35. Samuel Montellano Aparicio, district director of education, interview, Sucre,
14 April 1997.
36. Hernán Vargas Rivera, agro-industrialist, television station owner and ADN
chief, interview, Guayaramerín, 21 October 1997.
37. Adrián Rivera, electricity cooperative president, moneylender, and hotel
owner, interview, Guayaramerín, 21 October 1997. The only bank in Guayaramerín
is a branch of BIDESA, which dispenses local salaries but does not lend.
38. Quien manda? in Spanish.
39. Vargas R., interview.
40. Chorolque, Animas, and Siete Suyos are the main ones.
41. Dessart, interview. Fr. Dessart worked in Atocha for more than three decades.
42. The state mining enterprise, formed in the 1952 revolution.
43. The Bolivian Confederation of Labor, of which miners were traditionally the
backbone. Between the 1950s and the 1980s the COB deliberated economic policy
directly with the employers’ federation and the government of the day.
44. Pablo Victorio Ayala, mayor, interview, Ánimas, 22 April 1997.
45. Juan Velabaruta, Esteban Copa, Felipe Sapana, and Sabanio Fernández
Alanoca, community leader, community, ex-leader, and of‹cer, interview, Mojo-
toro, 18 April 1997.
46. Montellano A., interview.
47. Sisters Pilar and Teresa and Prof. Oscar Velázquez, CETHA, interview, Bau-
res, 4 May 1997. CETHA is a church-supported institution specializing in adult ed-
ucation.
48. Juan Oni Antelo, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May
1997.
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49. Melgar and Ayllón, interview.
50. El Cairo, interview.
51. Rich here is a relative term speci‹c to the local context of each case.
52. Victorio A., interview; Severo García Cándia, neighborhood council ex-pres-
ident, interview, Atocha, 23 April 1997.
53. Mojotoro, interview; Walter Encinas, community leader, interview, Potolo, 19
April 1997.
54. In an area of 110,000 hectares.
55. Bonilla R., interview; Hernán Gutiérrez Viveros and Rómulo Oyola Morales,
chief administrative of‹cer and ex-mayor, and technical of‹cer, interview, Porongo,
8 April 1997.
56. Rojas A., interview.
57. Bonilla R., interview; Roberto Suárez, district doctor, interview, Porongo, 9
April 1997.
58. Cecilia Bonilla, school association president, interview, Villa Guadalupe, 8
April 1997.
59. The probability that an incremental voter (brought in from outside) will be
electorally decisive is a decreasing function of the number of voters in the district.
See Seabright (1996).
60. I refer here to the internal accountability of the local political system. For
purposes of analysis, this is distinguished from the institutional accountability that
the OC brings to bear within the local institutional framework.
61. Victorio A., interview; Albino García Choque, Juan Bonifacio Onofre, Este-
ban Marcha Cachambre, and Ivan Marca, miners’ cooperative welfare of‹cer, over-
sight of‹cer, oversight of‹cer, and member, interview, Chorolque, 23 April 1997.
62. Bonilla R., interview. It remained to be seen if this initiative would succeed.
63. I.e., labor, landowners, owners of capital, and so forth.
64. Guido Roca.
65. Vargas R., interview. Cacho owned Guayaramerín’s two other television stations.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., “Tilly” Rodríguez was widely denounced by people throughout Gua-
yaramerín.
68. Demetrio Orellana, community leader, interview, Parotani, 27 May 1997.
69. Juan José Bonifaz, general adviser to the prefect, interview, Sucre, 15 April
1997.
70. Sr. Ana López, NGO director, interview, Guayaramerín, 22 October 1997.
71. Olson (2000b). My use of this concept is explained in chapter 6.
72. Respectively and jointly. Heterogeneity points to both characteristics,
whereas encompassing interest refers mainly to the latter.
73. Self-identi‹ed.
74. 1992 census.
75. Srs. Pilar and Teresa and Prof. Oscar Velázquez, interview.
76. Oscar Durán, president of the Nicolás Carageorge neighborhood council, in-
terview, Baures, 2 May 1997.
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77. Organizaciones Territoriales de Base in Spanish, or OTBs.
78. Jasiakiri, interview.
79. Yáñez and Sobut, interview; Jaime Gallo Garabinto, municipal council-
man (MIR), interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. There was general agreement on this
point.
80. A Bolivian term for highlanders.
81. García C., interview.
82. Villa Solano, for example, reported that its ‹rst attempt to form a GRO had
failed when the elected leader disappeared from Atocha.
83. Fernando Beltrán, FANCESA (cement company) general manager, inter-
view, Sucre, 18 April 1997.
84. Potolo, interview.
85. Chorolque, interview.
86. Interview evidence is at variance with of‹cial statistics on this point. I as-
sume interview subjects’ ‹gure of 11 is correct, and ascribe discrepancy with the
of‹cial number to two causes: (1) several communities joining to form a single
GRO, and (2) the high dispersion/low spatial density of many of Desaguadero’s
communities.
87. Xavier Albó, Armando Godínez, Kitula Libermann, and Francisco Pifarré,
Para Comprender Las Cultural Rurales en Bolivia (La Paz: MEC/CIPCA/UNICEF,
1990), 48–56.
88. Ibid.
89. Respondents insisted that the two forms were different, though they
seemed unable to articulate the difference clearly.
90. Juan Nina Quispe, oversight committee vice president and neighborhood
council president, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997.
91. Urban respondents’ approval of the LPP based on supposed large invest-
ments in the countryside, which were denied by rural respondents, is evidence of
this. See the end of the second section of the bonus web chapter text.
92. Sosa S., interview. According to him, the city’s population rose from 3,000
to 38,000 over 54 years.
93. Sr. Ana López, director of Caritas (NGO), interview.
94. Ibid.
95. Fr. Julio Corredor, parish priest, interview, Guayaramerín, 19 October 1997.
96. Manlio Roca, port (customs) manager, ex-mayor and ex-MP, interview,
Guayaramerín, 21 October 1997.
97. Elío Simoni Casangeli, Chamber of Industry and Commerce secretary, in-
terview, Guayaramerín, 21 October 1997.
98. Dionisia Cuéllar Pérez, Emilse Choquere, and Santiago Méndez, commu-
nity of‹cers, interview, 1o de Mayo, 23 October 1997.
99. J. Corredor, interview.
100. Hugo Ayllón Parada, Cattlemen’s Association president, interview, Baures, 2
May 1997.
101. El Cairo, interview.
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102. El Cairo, interview; Jasiakiri, interview; Srs. Pilar and Teresa and Prof. Oscar
Velázquez, interview.
103. Oni Antelo, interview.
104. The OC was able to have a fence, originally planned for a sports ‹eld, reas-
signed to the local cemetery in order to keep out stray dogs.
105. Beltrán, interview.
106. Potolo, interview.
107. J. Bonifaz, interview.
108. Marta Oyola Morales, president of the Civic Committee for Women, inter-
view, Porongo, 7 April 1997. Oyola lived in Santa Cruz but came to Porongo “every
weekend.”
109. The order of priorities is telling.
110. Villa Guadalupe, interview.
111. Victorio A., interview.
112. Mamani V., interview.
113. Justo José Apaza, community leader, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997;
Constantino Aruquipa and anonymous, school association president and member,
interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997.
114. The following day he was still too ill to see me.
115. Nina Q., interview.
116. Simoni, interview.
117. Iván Nincevic Landívar, municipal council president (ADN) and telephone
cooperative president, interview, Guayaramerín, 20 October 1997.
118. 1o de Mayo, interview.
119. Zacarías Catalayud, oversight committee vice president, interview, Gua-
yaramerín, 20 October 1997.
120. Pedro Noel Herrera Delgado, departmental forest inspector, interview, Gua-
yaramerín, 21 October 1997.
121. Catalayud, interview.
122. 1o de Mayo, interview.
123. Mallco Rancho, interview.
124. Siquisiquía, interview.
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